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Abstract
Neural networks can synchronize by learning from each other. For that pur-
pose they receive common inputs and exchange their outputs. Adjusting discrete
weights according to a suitable learning rule then leads to full synchronization in
a finite number of steps. It is also possible to train additional neural networks by
using the inputs and outputs generated during this process as examples. Several
algorithms for both tasks are presented and analyzed.
In the case of Tree Parity Machines the dynamics of both processes is driven
by attractive and repulsive stochastic forces. Thus it can be described well by
models based on random walks, which represent either the weights themselves or
order parameters of their distribution. However, synchronization is much faster
than learning. This effect is caused by different frequencies of attractive and
repulsive steps, as only neural networks interacting with each other are able to
skip unsuitable inputs. Scaling laws for the number of steps needed for full syn-
chronization and successful learning are derived using analytical models. They
indicate that the difference between both processes can be controlled by changing
the synaptic depth. In the case of bidirectional interaction the synchronization
time increases proportional to the square of this parameter, but it grows expo-
nentially, if information is transmitted in one direction only.
Because of this effect neural synchronization can be used to construct a cryp-
tographic key-exchange protocol. Here the partners benefit from mutual inter-
action, so that a passive attacker is usually unable to learn the generated key
in time. The success probabilities of different attack methods are determined by
numerical simulations and scaling laws are derived from the data. If the synap-
tic depth is increased, the complexity of a successful attack grows exponentially,
but there is only a polynomial increase of the effort needed to generate a key.
Therefore the partners can reach any desired level of security by choosing suit-
able parameters. In addition, the entropy of the weight distribution is used to
determine the effective number of keys, which are generated in different runs of
the key-exchange protocol using the same sequence of input vectors.
If the common random inputs are replaced with queries, synchronization is
possible, too. However, the partners have more control over the difficulty of the
key exchange and the attacks. Therefore they can improve the security without
increasing the average synchronization time.
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Zusammenfassung
Neuronale Netze, die die gleichen Eingaben erhalten und ihre Ausgaben austau-
schen, ko¨nnen voneinander lernen und auf diese Weise synchronisieren. Wenn
diskrete Gewichte und eine geeignete Lernregel verwendet werden, kommt es in
endlich vielen Schritten zur vollsta¨ndigen Synchronisation. Mit den dabei erzeug-
ten Beispielen lassen sich weitere neuronale Netze trainieren. Es werden mehrere
Algorithmen fu¨r beide Aufgaben vorgestellt und untersucht.
Attraktive und repulsive Zufallskra¨fte treiben bei Tree Parity Machines so-
wohl den Synchronisationsvorgang als auch die Lernprozesse an, so dass sich
alle Abla¨ufe gut durch Random-Walk-Modelle beschreiben lassen. Dabei sind
die Random Walks entweder die Gewichte selbst oder Ordnungsparameter ihrer
Verteilung. Allerdings sind miteinander wechselwirkende neuronale Netze in der
Lage, ungeeignete Eingaben zu u¨berspringen und so repulsive Schritte teilweise
zu vermeiden. Deshalb ko¨nnen Tree Parity Machines schneller synchronisieren als
lernen. Aus analytischen Modellen abgeleitete Skalengesetze zeigen, dass der Un-
terschied zwischen beiden Vorga¨ngen von der synaptischen Tiefe abha¨ngt. Wenn
die beiden neuronalen Netze sich gegenseitig beeinflussen ko¨nnen, steigt die Syn-
chronisationszeit nur proportional zu diesem Parameter an; sie wa¨chst jedoch
exponentiell, sobald die Informationen nur in eine Richtung fließen.
Deswegen la¨sst sich mittels neuronaler Synchronisation ein kryptographisches
Schlu¨sselaustauschprotokoll realisieren. Da die Partner sich gegenseitig beeinflus-
sen, der Angreifer diese Mo¨glichkeit aber nicht hat, gelingt es ihm meistens nicht,
den erzeugten Schlu¨ssel rechtzeitig zu finden. Die Erfolgswahrscheinlichkeiten der
verschiedenen Angriffe werden mittels numerischer Simulationen bestimmt. Die
dabei gefundenen Skalengesetze zeigen, dass die Komplexita¨t eines erfolgreichen
Angriffs exponentiell mit der synaptischen Tiefe ansteigt, aber der Aufwand fu¨r
den Schlu¨sselaustausch selbst nur polynomial anwa¨chst. Somit ko¨nnen die Partner
jedes beliebige Sicherheitsniveau durch geeignete Wahl der Parameter erreichen.
Außerdem wird die effektive Zahl der Schlu¨ssel berechnet, die das Schlu¨sselaus-
tauschprotokoll bei vorgegebener Zeitreihe der Eingaben erzeugen kann.
Der neuronale Schlu¨sselaustausch funktioniert auch dann, wenn die Zufalls-
eingaben durch Queries ersetzt werden. Jedoch haben die Partner in diesem Fall
mehr Kontrolle u¨ber die Komplexita¨t der Synchronisation und der Angriffe. Des-
halb gelingt es, die Sicherheit zu verbessern, ohne den Aufwand zu erho¨hen.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Synchronization is an interesting phenomenon, which can be observed in a lot of
physical and also biological systems [1]. It has been first discovered for weakly
coupled oscillators, which develop a constant phase relation to each other. While
a lot of systems show this type of synchronization, a periodic time evolution is
not required. This is clearly visible in the case of chaotic systems. These can be
synchronized by a common source of noise [2, 3] or by interaction [4, 5].
As soon as full synchronization is achieved, one observes two or more systems
with identical dynamics. But sometimes only parts synchronize. And it is even
possible that one finds a fixed relation between the states of the systems instead
of identical dynamics. Thus these phenomena look very different, although they
are all some kind of synchronization. In most situations it does not matter, if
the interaction is unidirectional or bidirectional. So there is usually no difference
between components, which influence each other actively and those which are
passively influenced by the dynamics of other systems.
Recently it has been discovered that artificial neural networks can synchro-
nize, too [6, 7]. These mathematical models have been first developed to study
and simulate the behavior of biological neurons. But it was soon discovered that
complex problems in computer science can be solved by using neural networks.
This is especially true if there is little information about the problem available.
In this case the development of a conventional algorithm is very difficult or even
impossible. In contrast, neural networks have the ability to learn from exam-
ples. That is why one does not have to know the exact rule in order to train
a neural network. In fact, it is sufficient to give some examples of the desired
classification and the network takes care of the generalization. Several methods
and applications of neural networks can be found in [8].
A feed-forward neural network defines a mapping between its input vector x
and one or more output values σi. Of course, this mapping is not fixed, but can
be changed by adjusting the weight vector w, which defines the influence of each
input value on the output. For the update of the weights there are two basic
algorithms possible: In batch learning all examples are presented at the same
9
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Figure 1.1: Key exchange between two partners with a passive attacker listening
to the communication.
time and then an optimal weight vector is calculated. Obviously, this only works
for static rules. But in online learning only one example is used in each time
step. Therefore it is possible to train a neural network using dynamical rules,
which change over time. Thus the examples can be generated by another neural
network, which adjusts its weights, too.
This approach leads to interacting neural feed-forward networks, which syn-
chronize by mutual learning [6]. They receive common input vectors and are
trained using the outputs of the other networks. After a short time full synchro-
nization is reached and one observes either parallel or anti-parallel weight vectors,
which stay synchronized, although they move in time. Similar to other systems
there is no obvious difference between unidirectional and bidirectional interaction
in the case of simple perceptrons [9].
But Tree Parity Machines, which are more complex neural networks with a
special structure, show a new phenomenon. Synchronization by mutual learning
is much faster than learning by adapting to examples generated by other networks
[9–12]. Therefore one can distinguish active and passive participants in such a
communication. This allows for new applications, which are not possible with
the systems known before. Especially the idea to use neural synchronization for
a cryptographic key-exchange protocol, which has been first proposed in [13], has
stimulated most research in this area [9–12, 14–24].
Such an algorithm can be used to solve a common cryptographic problem [25]:
Two partners Alice and Bob want to exchange secret messages over a public
channel. In order to protect the content against an opponent Eve, A encrypts
her message using a fast symmetric encryption algorithm. But now B needs to
know A’s key for reading her message. This situation is depicted in figure 1.1.
In fact, there are three possible solutions for this key-exchange problem [26].
First A and B could use a second private channel to transmit the key, e. g. they
could meet in person for this purpose. But usually this is very difficult or just
impossible. Alternatively, the partners can use public-key cryptography. Here
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an asymmetric encryption algorithm is employed so that the public keys of A’s
and B’s key pair can be exchanged between the partners without the need to
keep them secret. But asymmetric encryption is much slower than symmetric
algorithms. That is why it is only used to transmit a symmetric session key.
However, one can achieve the same result by using a key-exchange protocol. In
this case messages are transmitted over the public channel and afterwards A and
B generate a secret key based on the exchanged information. But E is unable to
discover the key because listening to the communication is not sufficient.
Such a protocol can be constructed using neural synchronization [13]. Two
Tree Parity Machines, one for A and one for B respectively, start with random
initial weights, which are kept secret. In each step a new random input vec-
tor is generated publicly. Then the partners calculate the output of their neural
networks and send it to each other. Afterwards the weight vectors are updated ac-
cording to a suitable learning rule. Because both inputs and weights are discrete,
this procedure leads to full synchronization, wAi = w
B
i , after a finite number of
steps. Then A and B can use the weight vectors as a common secret key.
In this case the difference between unidirectional learning and bidirectional
synchronization is essential for the security of the cryptographic application. As
E cannot influence A and B, she is usually not able to achieve synchronization by
the time A and B finish generating the key and stop the transmission of the output
bits [10]. Consequently, attacks based on learning have only a small probability
of success [16]. But using other methods is difficult, too. After all the attacker
does not know the internal representation of the multi-layer neural networks. In
contrast, it is easy to reconstruct the learning process of a perceptron exactly
due to the lack of hidden units. This corresponds with the observation that E is
nearly always successful, if these simple networks are used [9].
Of course, one wants to compare the level of security achieved by the neural
key-exchange protocol with other algorithms for key exchange. For that purpose
some assumptions are necessary, which are standard for all cryptographic systems:
• The attacker E knows all the messages exchanged between A and B. Thus
each participant has the same amount of information about all the oth-
ers. Furthermore the security of the neural key-exchange protocol does not
depend on some special properties of the transmission channel.
• E is unable to change the messages, so that only passive attacks are con-
sidered. In order to achieve security against active methods, e. g. man-in-
the-middle attacks, one has to implement additional provisions for authen-
tication.
• The algorithm is public, because keeping it secret does not improve the se-
curity at all, but prevents cryptographic analysis. Although vulnerabilities
may not be revealed, if one uses security by obscurity, an attacker can find
them nevertheless.
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In chapter 2 the basic algorithm for neural synchronization is explained. Def-
initions of the order parameters used to analyze this effect can be found there,
too. Additionally, it contains descriptions of all known methods for E’s attacks
on the neural key-exchange protocol.
Then the dynamics of neural synchronization is discussed in chapter 3. It is
shown that it is, in fact, a complex process driven by stochastic attractive and
repulsive forces, whose properties depend on the chosen parameters. Looking
especially at the average change of the overlap between corresponding hidden
units in A’s, B’s and E’s Tree Parity Machine reveals the differences between
bidirectional and unidirectional interaction clearly.
Chapter 4 focuses on the security of the neural key-exchange protocol, which
is essential for this application of neural synchronization. Of course, simulations
of cryptographic useful systems do not show successful attacks and the other way
round. That is why finding scaling laws in regard to effort and security is very
important. As these relations can be used to extrapolate reliably, they play a
major role here.
Finally, chapter 5 presents a modification of the neural key-exchange protocol:
Queries generated by A and B replace the random sequence of input vectors. Thus
the partners have more influence on the process of synchronization, because they
are able to control the frequency of repulsive steps as a function of the overlap. In
doing so, A and B can improve the security of the neural key-exchange protocol
without increasing the synchronization time.
Chapter 2
Neural synchronization
Synchronization of neural networks [6, 7, 9–11] is a special case of an online learn-
ing situation. Two neural networks start with randomly chosen weight vectors.
In each time step they receive a common input vector, calculate their outputs,
and communicate them to each other. If they agree on the mapping between the
current input and the output, their weights are updated according to a suitable
learning rule.
In the case of discrete weight values this process leads to full synchronization
in a finite number of steps [9–12, 27]. Afterwards corresponding weights in both
networks have the same value, even if they are updated by further applications
of the learning rule. Thus full synchronization is an absorbing state.
Additionally, a third neural network can be trained using the examples, input
vectors and output values, generated by the process of synchronization. As this
neural network cannot influence the others, it corresponds to a student network
which tries to learn a time dependent mapping between inputs and outputs.
In the case of perceptrons, which are simple neural networks, one cannot find
any significant difference between these two situations: the average number of
steps needed for synchronization and learning is the same [6, 7]. But in the case
of the more complex Tree Parity Machines an interesting phenomenon can be
observed: two neural networks learning from each other synchronize faster than
a third network only listening to the communication [9–12].
This difference between bidirectional and unidirectional interaction can be
used to solve the cryptographic key-exchange problem [13]. For that purpose
the partners A and B synchronize their Tree Parity Machines. In doing so they
generate their common session key faster than an attacker is able to discover it
by training another neural network. Consequently, the difference between syn-
chronization and learning is essential for the security of the neural key-exchange
protocol.
In this chapter the basic framework for neural synchronization is presented.
This includes the structure of the networks, the learning rules, and the quantities
used to describe the process of synchronization.
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2.1 Tree Parity Machines
Tree Parity Machines, which are used by partners and attackers in neural cryp-
tography, are multi-layer feed-forward networks. Their general structure is shown
in figure 2.1.
x
w
σ
τ
Π
Figure 2.1: A Tree Parity Machine with K = 3 and N = 4.
Such a neural network consists of K hidden units, which are perceptrons with
independent receptive fields. Each one has N input neurons and one output
neuron. All input values are binary,
xi,j ∈ {−1,+1} , (2.1)
and the weights, which define the mapping from input to output, are discrete
numbers between −L and +L,
wi,j ∈ {−L,−L+ 1, . . . ,+L} . (2.2)
Here the index i = 1, . . . , K denotes the i-th hidden unit of the Tree Parity
Machine and j = 1, . . . , N the elements of the vector.
As in other neural networks the weighted sum over the current input values
is used to determine the output of the hidden units. Therefore the full state of
each hidden neuron is given by its local field
hi =
1√
N
wi · xi = 1√
N
N∑
j=1
wi,j xi,j . (2.3)
The output σi of the i-th hidden unit is then defined as the sign of hi,
σi = sgn(hi) , (2.4)
but the special case hi = 0 is mapped to σi = −1 in order to ensure a binary
output value. Thus a hidden unit is only active, σi = +1, if the weighted sum
over its inputs is positive, otherwise it is inactive, σi = −1.
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Then the total output τ of a Tree Parity Machine is given by the product
(parity) of the hidden units,
τ =
K∏
i=1
σi , (2.5)
so that τ only indicates, if the number of inactive hidden units, with σi = −1, is
even (τ = +1) or odd (τ = −1). Consequently, there are 2K−1 different internal
representations (σ1, σ2, . . . , σK), which lead to the same output value τ .
If there is only one hidden unit, τ is equal to σ1. Consequently, a Tree Parity
Machine with K = 1 shows the same behavior as a perceptron, which can be
regarded as a special case of the more complex neural network.
2.2 Learning rules
At the beginning of the synchronization process A’s and B’s Tree Parity Machines
start with randomly chosen and therefore uncorrelated weight vectors w
A/B
i . In
each time step K public input vectors xi are generated randomly and the corre-
sponding output bits τA/B are calculated.
Afterwards A and B communicate their output bits to each other. If they
disagree, τA 6= τB, the weights are not changed. Otherwise one of the following
learning rules suitable for synchronization is applied:
• In the case of the Hebbian learning rule [16] both neural networks learn
from each other:
w+i,j = g(wi,j + xi,jτΘ(σiτ)Θ(τ
AτB)) . (2.6)
• It is also possible that both networks are trained with the opposite of their
own output. This is achieved by using the anti-Hebbian learning rule [11]:
w+i,j = g(wi,j − xi,jτΘ(σiτ)Θ(τAτB)) . (2.7)
• But the set value of the output is not important for synchronization as long
as it is the same for all participating neural networks. That is why one can
use the random-walk learning rule [12], too:
w+i,j = g(wi,j + xi,jΘ(σiτ)Θ(τ
AτB)) . (2.8)
In any way only weights are changed by these learning rules, which are in hidden
units with σi = τ . By doing so it is impossible to tell which weights are up-
dated without knowing the internal representation (σ1, σ2, . . . , σK). This feature
is especially needed for the cryptographic application of neural synchronization.
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Of course, the learning rules have to assure that the weights stay in the allowed
range between −L and +L. If any weight moves outside this region, it is reset
to the nearest boundary value ±L. This is achieved by the function g(w) in each
learning rule:
g(w) =
{
sgn(w)L for |w| > L
w otherwise
. (2.9)
Afterwards the current synchronization step is finished. This process can be
repeated until corresponding weights in A’s and B’s Tree Parity Machine have
equal values, wAi = w
B
i . Further applications of the learning rule are unable
to destroy this synchronization, because the movements of the weights depend
only on the inputs and weights, which are then identical in A’s and B’s neural
networks.
2.3 Order parameters
In order to describe the correlations between two Tree Parity Machines caused
by the synchronization process, one can look at the probability distribution of
the weight values in each hidden unit. It is given by (2L+ 1) variables
pia,b = P (w
A
i,j = a ∧ wBi,j = b) , (2.10)
which are defined as the probability to find a weight with wAi,j = a in A’s Tree
Parity Machine and wBi,j = b in B’s neural network.
While these probabilities are only approximately given as relative frequencies
in simulations with finite N , their development can be calculated using exact
equations of motion in the limit N → ∞ [17–19]. This method is explained in
detail in appendix B.
In both cases, simulation and iterative calculation, the standard order param-
eters [28], which are also used for the analysis of online learning, can be calculated
as functions of pia,b:
QAi =
1
N
wAi w
A
i =
L∑
a=−L
L∑
b=−L
a2 pia,b , (2.11)
QBi =
1
N
wBi w
B
i =
L∑
a=−L
L∑
b=−L
b2 pia,b , (2.12)
RABi =
1
N
wAi w
B
i =
L∑
a=−L
L∑
b=−L
a b pia,b . (2.13)
Then the level of synchronization is given by the normalized overlap [28] between
two corresponding hidden units:
ρABi =
wAi ·wBi√
wAi ·wAi
√
wBi ·wBi
=
RABi√
QAi Q
B
i
. (2.14)
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Uncorrelated hidden units, e. g. at the beginning of the synchronization process,
have ρi = 0, while the maximum value ρi = 1 is reached for fully synchronized
weights. Consequently, ρi is the most important quantity for analyzing the pro-
cess of synchronization.
But it is also interesting to estimate the mutual information gained by the
partners during the process of synchronization. For this purpose one has to
calculate the entropy [29]
SABi = −N
L∑
a=−L
L∑
b=−L
pia,b ln p
i
a,b (2.15)
of the joint weight distribution of A’s and B’s neural networks. Similarly the
entropy of the weights in a single hidden unit is given by
SAi = −N
L∑
a=−L
(
L∑
b=−L
pia,b
)
ln
(
L∑
b=−L
pia,b
)
, (2.16)
SBi = −N
L∑
b=−L
(
L∑
a=−L
pia,b
)
ln
(
L∑
a=−L
pia,b
)
. (2.17)
Of course, these equations assume that there are no correlations between differ-
ent weights in one hidden unit. This is correct in the limit N → ∞, but not
necessarily for small systems.
Using (2.15), (2.16), and (2.17) the mutual information [29] of A’s and B’s
Tree Parity Machines can be calculated as
IAB =
K∑
i=1
(
SAi + S
B
i − SABi
)
. (2.18)
At the beginning of the synchronization process, the partners only know the
weight configuration of their own neural network, so that IAB = 0. But for fully
synchronized weight vectors this quantity is equal to the entropy of a single Tree
Parity Machine, which is given by
S0 = KN ln(2L+ 1) (2.19)
in the case of uniformly distributed weights.
2.4 Neural cryptography
The neural key-exchange protocol [13] is an application of neural synchronization.
Both partners A and B use a Tree Parity Machine with the same structure. The
parameters K, L and N are public. Each neural network starts with randomly
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chosen weight vectors. These initial conditions are kept secret. During the syn-
chronization process, which is described in section 2.2, only the input vectors xi
and the total outputs τA, τB are transmitted over the public channel. Therefore
each participant just knows the internal representation (σ1, σ2, . . . , σK) of his own
Tree Parity Machine. Keeping this information secret is essential for the security
of the key-exchange protocol. After achieving full synchronization A and B use
the weight vectors as common secret key.
The main problem of the attacker E is that the internal representations
(σ1, σ2, . . . , σK) of A’s and B’s Tree Parity Machines are not known to her. As
the movement of the weights depends on σi, it is important for a successful attack
to guess the state of the hidden units correctly. Of course, most known attacks
use this approach. But there are other possibilities and it is indeed possible that
a clever attack method will be found, which breaks the security of neural cryp-
tography completely. However, this risk exists for all cryptographic algorithms
except the one-time pad.
2.4.1 Simple attack
For the simple attack [13] E just trains a third Tree Parity Machine with the
examples consisting of input vectors xi and output bits τ
A. These can be obtained
easily by intercepting the messages transmitted by the partners over the public
channel. E’s neural network has the same structure as A’s and B’s and starts
with random initial weights, too.
In each time step the attacker calculates the output of her neural network.
Afterwards E uses the same learning rule as the partners, but τE is replaced by
τA. Thus the update of the weights is given by one of the following equations:
• Hebbian learning rule:
wE+i,j = g(w
E
i,j + xi,jτ
AΘ(σEi τ
A)Θ(τAτB)) . (2.20)
• Anti-Hebbian learning rule:
wE+i,j = g(w
E
i,j − xi,jτAΘ(σEi τA)Θ(τAτB)) . (2.21)
• Random walk learning rule:
wE+i,j = g(w
E
i,j + xi,jΘ(σ
E
i τ
A)Θ(τAτB)) . (2.22)
So E uses the internal representation (σE1 , σ
E
2 , . . . , σ
E
K) of her own network in
order to estimate A’s, even if the total output is different. As τA 6= τE indicates
that there is at least one hidden unit with σAi 6= σEi , this is certainly not the best
algorithm available for an attacker.
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2.4.2 Geometric attack
The geometric attack [20] performs better than the simple attack, because E takes
τE and the local fields of her hidden units into account. In fact, it is the most
successful method for an attacker using only a single Tree Parity Machine.
Similar to the simple attack E tries to imitate B without being able to interact
with A. As long as τA = τE , this can be done by just applying the same learning
rule as the partners A and B. But in the case of τE 6= τA E cannot stop A’s update
of the weights. Instead the attacker tries to correct the internal representation of
her own Tree Parity Machine using the local fields hE1 , h
E
2 , . . . , h
E
K as additional
information. These quantities can be used to determine the level of confidence
associated with the output of each hidden unit [30]. As a low absolute value |hEi |
indicates a high probability of σAi 6= σEi , the attacker changes the output σEi of
the hidden unit with minimal |hEi | and the total output τE before applying the
learning rule.
Of course, the geometric attack does not always succeed in estimating the
internal representation of A’s Tree Parity Machine correctly. Sometimes there
are several hidden units with σAi 6= σEi . In this case the change of one output bit
is not enough. It is also possible that σAi = σ
E
i for the hidden unit with minimal
|hEi |, so that the geometric correction makes the result worse than before.
2.4.3 Majority attack
With the majority attack [21] E can improve her ability to predict the internal
representation of A’s neural network. For that purpose the attacker uses an
ensemble of M Tree Parity Machines instead of a single neural network. At
the beginning of the synchronization process the weight vectors of all attacking
networks are chosen randomly, so that their average overlap is zero.
Similar to other attacks, E does not change the weights in time steps with
τA 6= τB, because the partners skip these input vectors, too. But for τA = τB an
update is necessary and the attacker calculates the output bits τE,m of her Tree
Parity Machines. If the output bit τE,m of the m-th attacking network disagrees
with τA, E searches the hidden unit i with minimal absolute local field |hE,mi |.
Then the output bits σE,mi and τ
E,m are inverted similarly to the geometric attack.
Afterwards the attacker counts the internal representations (σE,m1 , . . . , σ
E,m
K ) of
her Tree Parity Machines and selects the most common one. This majority vote
is then adopted by all attacking networks for the application of the learning rule.
But these identical updates create and amplify correlations between E’s Tree
Parity Machines, which reduce the efficiency of the majority attack. Especially if
the attacking neural networks become fully synchronized, this method is reduced
to a geometric attack.
In order to keep the Tree Parity Machines as uncorrelated as possible, majority
attack and geometric attack are used alternately [21]. In even time steps the
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majority vote is used for learning, but otherwise E only applies the geometric
correction. Therefore not all updates of the weight vectors are identical, so that
the overlap between them is reduced. Additionally, E replaces the majority attack
by the geometric attack in the first 100 time steps of the synchronization process.
2.4.4 Genetic attack
The genetic attack [22] offers an alternative approach for the opponent, which is
not based on optimizing the prediction of the internal representation, but on an
evolutionary algorithm. E starts with only one randomly initialized Tree Parity
Machine, but she can use up to M neural networks.
Whenever the partners update the weights because of τA = τB in a time step,
the following genetic algorithm is applied:
• As long as E has at most M/2K−1 Tree Parity Machines, she determines all
2K−1 internal representations (σE1 , . . . , σ
E
K) which reproduce the output τ
A.
Afterwards these are used to update the weights in the attacking networks
according to the learning rule. By doing so E creates 2K−1 variants of each
Tree Parity Machine in this mutation step.
• But if E already has more than M/2K−1 neural networks, only the fittest
Tree Parity Machines should be kept. This is achieved by discarding all
networks which predicted less than U outputs τA in the last V learning
steps, with τA = τB, successfully. A limit of U = 10 and a history of
V = 20 are used as default values for the selection step. Additionally, E
keeps at least 20 of her Tree Parity Machines.
The efficiency of the genetic attack mostly depends on the algorithm which
selects the fittest neural networks. In the ideal case the Tree Parity Machine,
which has the same sequence of internal representations as A is never discarded.
Then the problem of the opponent E would be reduced to the synchronization
of K perceptrons and the genetic attack would succeed certainly. However, this
algorithm as well as other methods available for the opponent E are not perfect,
which is clearly shown in chapter 4.
Chapter 3
Dynamics of the neural
synchronization process
Neural synchronization is a stochastic process consisting of discrete steps, in
which the weights of participating neural networks are adjusted according to the
algorithms presented in chapter 2. In order to understand why unidirectional
learning and bidirectional synchronization show different effects, it is reasonable
to take a closer look at the dynamics of these processes.
Although both are completely determined by the initial weight vectors wi
of the Tree Parity Machines and the sequence of random input vectors xi, one
cannot calculate the result of each initial condition, as there are too many except
for very small systems. Instead of that the effect of the synchronization steps
on the overlap ρi of two corresponding hidden units is analyzed. This order
parameter is defined as the cosine of the angle between the weight vectors [28].
Attractive steps increase the overlap, while repulsive steps decrease it [19].
As the probabilities for both types of steps as well as the average step sizes
〈∆ρa〉, 〈∆ρr〉 depend on the current overlap, neural synchronization can be re-
garded as a random walk in ρ-space. Hence the average change of the overlap
〈∆ρ(ρ)〉 shows the most important properties of the dynamics. Especially the
difference between bidirectional and unidirectional interaction is clearly visible.
As long as two Tree Parity Machines influence each other, repulsive steps
have only little effect on the process of synchronization. Therefore it is possible
to neglect this type of step in order to determine the scaling of the synchronization
time tsync. For that purpose a random walk model consisting of two corresponding
weights is analyzed [27].
But in the case of unidirectional interaction the higher frequency of repulsive
steps leads to a completely different dynamics of the system, so that synchro-
nization is only possible by fluctuations. Hence the scaling of 〈tsync〉 changes to
an exponential increase with L. This effect is important for the cryptographic
application of neural synchronization, as it is essential for the security of the
neural key-exchange protocol.
21
22 3. Dynamics of the neural synchronization process
3.1 Effect of the learning rules
The learning rules used for synchronizing Tree Parity Machines, which have been
presented in section 2.2, share a common structure. That is why they can be
described by a single equation
w+i,j = g(wi,j + f(σi, τ
A, τB)xi,j) (3.1)
with a function f(σ, τA, τB), which can take the values −1, 0, or +1. In the case
of bidirectional interaction it is given by
f(σ, τA, τB) = Θ(στA)Θ(τAτB)


σ Hebbian learning rule
−σ anti-Hebbian learning rule
1 random walk learning rule
. (3.2)
The common part Θ(στA)Θ(τAτB) of f(σ, τA, τB) controls, when the weight vec-
tor of a hidden unit is adjusted. Because it is responsible for the occurrence of
attractive and repulsive steps as shown in section 3.1.2, all three learning rules
have similar effects on the overlap. But the second part, which influences the
direction of the movements, changes the distribution of the weights in the case
of Hebbian and anti-Hebbian learning. This results in deviations, especially for
small system sizes, which is the topic of section 3.1.1.
Equation (3.1) together with (3.2) also describes the update of the weights
for unidirectional interaction, after the output τE and the internal representation
(σE1 , σ
E
2 , . . . , σ
E
K) have been adjusted by the learning algorithm. That is why one
observes the same types of steps in this case.
3.1.1 Distribution of the weights
According to (3.2) the only difference between the learning rules is, whether and
how the output σi of a hidden unit affects ∆wi,j = w
+
i,j−wi,j . Although this does
not change the qualitative effect of an update step, it influences the distribution
of the weights [22].
In the case of the Hebbian rule (2.6), A’s and B’s Tree Parity Machines learn
their own output. Therefore the direction in which the weight wi,j moves is
determined by the product σixi,j . As the output σi is a function of all input
values, xi,j and σi are correlated random variables. Thus the probabilities to
observe σixi,j = +1 or σixi,j = −1 are not equal, but depend on the value of the
corresponding weight wi,j:
P (σixi,j = 1) =
1
2

1 + erf

 wi,j√
NQi − w2i,j



 . (3.3)
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According to this equation, σixi,j = sgn(wi,j) occurs more often than the opposite,
σixi,j = −sgn(wi,j). Consequently, the Hebbian learning rule (2.6) pushes the
weights towards the boundaries at −L and +L.
In order to quantify this effect the stationary probability distribution of the
weights for t→∞ is calculated using (3.3) for the transition probabilities. This
leads to [22]
P (wi,j = w) = p0
|w|∏
m=1
1 + erf
(
m−1√
NQi−(m−1)2
)
1− erf
(
m√
NQi−m2
) . (3.4)
Here the normalization constant p0 is given by
p0 =


L∑
w=−L
|w|∏
m=1
1 + erf
(
m−1√
NQi−(m−1)2
)
1− erf
(
m√
NQi−m2
)


−1
. (3.5)
In the limit N → ∞ the argument of the error functions vanishes, so that the
weights stay uniformly distributed. In this case the initial length
√
Qi(t = 0) =
√
L(L+ 1)
3
(3.6)
of the weight vectors is not changed by the process of synchronization.
But, for finite N the probability distribution (3.4) itself depends on the order
parameter Qi. Therefore its expectation value is given by the solution of the
following equation:
Qi =
L∑
w=−L
w2P (wi,j = w) . (3.7)
Expanding it in terms of N−1/2 results in [22]
Qi =
L(L+ 1)
3
+
8L4 + 16L3 − 10L2 − 18L+ 9
15
√
3πL(L+ 1)
1√
N
+O
(
L4
N
)
(3.8)
as a first-order approximation of Qi for large system sizes. The asymptotic be-
havior of this order parameter in the case of 1≪ L≪ √N is given by
Qi ∼ L(L+ 1)
3
(
1 +
8
5
√
3π
L√
N
)
. (3.9)
Thus each application of the Hebbian learning rule increases the length of the
weight vectors wi until a steady state is reached. The size of this effect depends
on L/
√
N and disappears in the limit L/
√
N → 0.
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Figure 3.1: Length of the weight vectors in the steady state for K = 3 and
N = 1000. Symbols denote results averaged over 1000 simulations and lines
show the first-order approximation given in (3.8) and (3.10).
In the case of the anti-Hebbian rule (2.7) A’s and B’s Tree Parity Machines
learn the opposite of their own outputs. Therefore the weights are pulled away
from the boundaries instead of being pushed towards ±L. Here the first-order
approximation of Qi is given by [22]
Qi =
L(L+ 1)
3
− 8L
4 + 16L3 − 10L2 − 18L+ 9
15
√
3πL(L+ 1)
1√
N
+O
(
L4
N
)
, (3.10)
which asymptotically converges to
Qi ∼ L(L+ 1)
3
(
1− 8
5
√
3π
L√
N
)
(3.11)
in the case 1 ≪ L ≪ √N . Hence applying the anti-Hebbian learning rule
decreases the length of the weight vectors wi until a steady state is reached. As
before, L/
√
N determines the size of this effect.
In contrast, the random walk rule (2.8) always uses a fixed set output. Here
the weights stay uniformly distributed, as the random input values xi,j alone
determine the direction of the movements. Consequently, the length of the weight
vectors is always given by (3.6).
Figure 3.1 shows that the theoretical predictions are in good quantitative
agreement with simulation results as long as L2 is small compared to the system
size N . The deviations for large L are caused by higher-order terms which are
ignored in (3.8) and (3.10).
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Figure 3.2: Time evolution of the weight distribution in the case of synchroniza-
tion with K = 3 and L = 5, obtained in 100 simulations consisting of 100 pairs
of Tree Parity Machines.
Of course, the change of the weight distribution is also directly visible in the
relative entropy SA/S0 as shown in figure 3.2. While the weights are always
uniformly distributed at the beginning of the synchronization process, so that
SA = S0, only the random walk learning rule preserves this property. Otherwise
SA decreases until the length of the weight vectors reaches its stationary state
after a few steps. Therefore the transient has only little influence on the process
of synchronization and one can assume a constant value of both Qi and S
A.
In the limit N →∞, however, a system using Hebbian or anti-Hebbian learn-
ing exhibits the same dynamics as observed in the case of the random walk rule for
all system sizes. Consequently, there are two possibilities to determine the prop-
erties of neural synchronization without interfering finite-size effects. First, one
can run simulations for the random walk learning rule and moderate system sizes.
Second, the evolution of the probabilities pia,b, which describe the distribution of
the weights in two corresponding hidden units, can be calculated iteratively for
N →∞. Both methods have been used in order to obtain the results presented
in this thesis.
3.1.2 Attractive and repulsive steps
As the internal representation (σ1, σ2, . . . , σK) is not visible to other neural net-
works, two types of synchronization steps are possible:
• For τA = σAi = σBi = τB the weights of both corresponding hidden units are
moved in the same direction. As long as both weights, wAi,j and w
B
i,j, stay
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in the range between −L and +L, their distance di,j = |wAi,j −wBi,j| remains
unchanged. But if one of them hits the boundary at ±L, it is reflected, so
that di,j decreases by one, until di,j = 0 is reached. Therefore a sequence of
these attractive steps leads to full synchronization eventually.
• If τA = τB, but σAi 6= σBi , only the weight vector of one hidden unit is
changed. Two corresponding weights which have been already synchro-
nized before, wAi,j = w
B
i,j, are separated by this movement, unless this is
prevented by the boundary conditions. Consequently, this repulsive step
reduces the correlations between corresponding weights and impedes the
process of synchronization.
In all other situations the weights of the i-th hidden unit in A’s and B’s Tree
Parity Machines are not modified at all.
In the limit N → ∞ the effects of attractive and repulsive steps can be
described by the following equations of motion for the probability distribution
of the weights [17–19]. In attractive steps the weights perform an anisotropic
diffusion
pi+a,b =
1
2
(
pia+1,b+1 + p
i
a−1,b−1
)
(3.12)
and move on the diagonals of a (2L + 1) × (2L + 1) square lattice. Repulsive
steps, instead, are equal to normal diffusion steps
pi+a,b =
1
4
(
pia+1,b + p
i
a−1,b + p
i
a,b+1 + p
i
a,b−1
)
(3.13)
on the same lattice. However, one has to take the reflecting boundary conditions
into account. Therefore (3.12) and (3.13) are only defined for −L < a, b < +L.
Similar equations for the weights on the boundary can be found in appendix B.
Starting from the development of the variables pa,b one can calculate the
change of the overlap in both types of steps. In general, the results
∆ρa =
3
L(L+ 1)
(
1−
L∑
j=−L
(2j + 2)pL,j + pL,L
)
(3.14)
for attractive steps and
∆ρr = − 3
L(L + 1)
L∑
j=−L
j
2
(pL,j − p−L,j) (3.15)
for repulsive steps are not only functions of the current overlap, but also depend
explicitly on the probability distribution of the weights. That is why ∆ρa(ρ)
and ∆ρr(ρ) are random variables, whose properties have to be determined in
simulations of finite systems or iterative calculations for N →∞.
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Figure 3.3: Effect of attractive (upper curve) and repulsive steps (lower curve)
for K = 3 and L = 10. Symbols represent averages over 1000 simulations using
N = 100 and the random walk learning rule. The line shows the corresponding
result of 1000 iterative calculations for synchronization in the limit N →∞.
Figure 3.3 shows that each attractive step increases the overlap on average.
At the beginning of the synchronization it has its maximum effect [31],
∆ρa(ρ = 0) =
12L
(L+ 1)(2L+ 1)2
∼ 3
L2
, (3.16)
as the weights are uncorrelated,
pa,b(ρ = 0) =
1
(2L+ 1)2
. (3.17)
But as soon as full synchronization is reached, an attractive step cannot increase
the overlap further, so that ∆ρa(ρ = 1) = 0. Thus ρ = 1 is a fixed point for a
sequence of these steps.
In contrast, a repulsive step reduces a previously gained positive overlap on
average. Its maximum effect [31],
∆ρr(ρ = 1) = − 3
(L+ 1)(2L+ 1)
∼ − 3
2L2
, (3.18)
is reached in the case of fully synchronized weights,
pa,b(ρ = 1) =
{
(2L+ 1)−1 for a = b
0 for a 6= b . (3.19)
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Figure 3.4: Effect of attractive (upper curves) and repulsive steps (lower curves)
for different learning rules with K = 3 and L = 10. Symbols denote averages over
1000 simulations, while the lines show the results of 1000 iterative calculations.
But if the weights are uncorrelated, ρ = 0, a repulsive step has no effect. Hence
ρ = 0 is a fixed point for a sequence of these steps.
It is clearly visible in figure 3.3 that the results obtained by simulations with
the random walk learning rule and iterative calculations for N → ∞ are in
good quantitative agreement. This shows that both 〈∆ρa(ρ)〉 and 〈∆ρr(ρ)〉 are
independent of the system size N . Additionally, the choice of the synchronization
algorithm does not matter, which indicates a similar distribution of the weights for
both unidirectional and bidirectional interaction. Consequently, the differences
observed between learning and synchronization are caused by the probabilities of
attractive and repulsive steps, but not their effects.
However, the distribution of the weights is obviously altered by Hebbian and
anti-Hebbian learning in finite systems, so that average change of the overlap in
attractive and repulsive steps is different from the result for the random walk
learning rule. This is clearly visible in figure 3.4. In the case of the Hebbian
learning rule the effect of both types of steps is enhanced, but for anti-Hebbian
learning it is reduced. It is even possible that an repulsive step has an attractive
effect on average, if the overlap ρ is small. This explains why one observes finite-
size effects in the case of large L/
√
N [16].
Using the equations (3.16) and (3.18) one can obtain the rescaled quantities
〈∆ρa(ρ)〉/∆ρa(0) and 〈∆ρr(ρ)〉/∆ρr(1). They become asymptotically indepen-
dent of the synaptic depth L in the limit L → ∞ as shown in figure 3.5 and
figure 3.6. Therefore these two scaling functions together with ∆ρa(0) and ∆ρr(1)
are sufficient to describe the effect of attractive and repulsive steps [31].
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Figure 3.5: Scaling behavior of the average step size 〈∆ρa〉 for attractive steps.
These results were obtained in 1000 iterative calculations for K = 3 and N →∞.
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Figure 3.6: Scaling behavior of the average step size 〈∆ρr〉 for repulsive steps.
These results were obtained in 1000 iterative calculations for K = 3 and N →∞.
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3.2 Transition probabilities
While 〈∆ρa〉 and 〈∆ρr〉 are identical for synchronization and learning, the proba-
bilities of attractive and repulsive steps depend on the type of interaction between
the neural networks. Therefore these quantities are important for the differences
between partners and attackers in neural cryptography.
A repulsive step can only occur if two corresponding hidden units have differ-
ent σi. The probability for this event is given by the well-known generalization
error [28]
ǫi =
1
π
arccos ρi (3.20)
of the perceptron. However, disagreeing hidden units alone are not sufficient for a
repulsive step, as the weights of all neural networks are only changed if τA = τB.
Therefore the probability of a repulsive step is given by
Pr = P (σ
A
i 6= σB/Ei |τA = τB) , (3.21)
after possible corrections of the output bits have been applied in the case of
advanced learning algorithms. Similarly, one finds
Pa = P (τ
A = σAi = σ
B/E
i |τA = τB) (3.22)
for the probability of attractive steps.
3.2.1 Simple attack
In the case of the simple attack, the outputs σEi of E’s Tree Parity Machine are
not corrected before the application of the learning rule and the update of the
weights occurs independent of τE , as mutual interaction is not possible. Therefore
a repulsive step in the i-th hidden unit occurs with probability [19]
PEr = ǫi . (3.23)
But if two corresponding hidden units agree on their output σi, this does not
always lead to an attractive step, because σi = τ is another necessary condition
for an update of the weights. Thus the probability of an attractive step is given
by [31]
PEa =
1
2
(1− ǫi) (3.24)
for K > 1. In the special case K = 1, however, σi = τ is always true, so that this
type of steps occurs with double frequency: PEa = 1− ǫi.
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3.2.2 Synchronization
In contrast, mutual interaction is an integral part of bidirectional synchronization.
When an odd number of hidden units disagrees on the output, τA 6= τB signals
that adjusting the weights would have a repulsive effect on at least one of the
weight vectors. Therefore A and B skip this synchronization step.
But when an even number of hidden units disagrees on the output, the part-
ners cannot detect repulsive steps by comparing τA and τB. Additionally, iden-
tical internal representations in both networks are more likely than two or more
different output bits σAi 6= σBi , if there are already some correlations between the
Tree Parity Machines. Consequently, the weights are updated if τA = τB.
In the case of identical overlap in all K hidden units, ǫi = ǫ, the probability
of this event is given by
Pu = P (τ
A = τB) =
K/2∑
i=0
(
K
2i
)
(1− ǫ)K−2i ǫ2i . (3.25)
Of course, only attractive steps are possible if two perceptrons learn from each
other (K = 1). But for synchronization of Tree Parity Machines with K > 1, the
probabilities of attractive and repulsive are given by:
PBa =
1
2Pu
(K−1)/2∑
i=0
(
K − 1
2i
)
(1− ǫ)K−2i ǫ2i , (3.26)
PBr =
1
Pu
K/2∑
i=1
(
K − 1
2i− 1
)
(1− ǫ)K−2i ǫ2i . (3.27)
In the case of three hidden units (K = 3), which is the usual choice for the neural
key-exchange protocol, this leads to [19, 31]
PBa =
1
2
(1− ǫ)3 + (1− ǫ)ǫ2
(1− ǫ)3 + 3(1− ǫ)ǫ2 , (3.28)
PBr =
2(1− ǫ)ǫ2
(1− ǫ)3 + 3(1− ǫ)ǫ2 . (3.29)
Figure 3.7 shows that repulsive steps occur more frequently in E’s Tree Parity
Machine than in A’s or B’s for equal overlap 0 < ρ < 1. That is why the partners
A and B have a clear advantage over a simple attacker in neural cryptography.
But this difference becomes smaller and smaller with increasing K. Consequently,
a large number of hidden units is detrimental for the security of the neural key-
exchange protocol against the simple attack.
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Figure 3.7: Probability PBr (ρ) of repulsive steps for synchronization with mutual
interaction under the condition τA = τB. The dotted line shows PEr (ρ) for a
simple attack.
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Figure 3.8: Prediction error ǫpi as a function of the local field h
E
i for different
values of the overlap ρAEi and Qi = 1.
3.2 Transition probabilities 33
3.2.3 Geometric attack
However, E can do better than simple learning by taking the local field into
account. Then the probability of σEi 6= σAi is given by the prediction error [30]
ǫpi =
1
2
[
1− erf
(
ρi√
2(1− ρ2i )
|hi|√
Qi
)]
(3.30)
of the perceptron, which depends not only on the overlap ρi, but also on the
absolute value |hEi | of the local field. This quantity is a strictly decreasing function
of |hEi | as shown in figure 3.8. Therefore the geometric attack is often able to
find the hidden unit with σEi 6= σAi by searching for the minimum of |hEi |. If only
the i-th hidden unit disagrees and all other have σEj = σ
A
j , the probability for a
successful correction of the internal representation by using the geometric attack
is given by [22]
Pg =
∫ ∞
0
∏
j 6=i
(∫ ∞
hi
2√
2πQj
1− ǫpj
1− ǫj e
−
h2j
2Qj dhj
)
2√
2πQi
ǫpi
ǫi
e
−
h2
i
2Qi dhi . (3.31)
In the case of identical order parameters Q = QEj and R = R
AE
j this equation can
be easily extended to k out of K hidden units with different outputs σAj 6= σEj .
Then the probability for successful correction of σEi 6= σAi is given by
P+k =
∫ ∞
0
(
2√
2πQ
)K (∫ ∞
hi
1− ǫp(h)
1− ǫ e
− h
2
2Q dh
)K−k
×
(∫ ∞
hi
ǫp(h)
ǫ
e−
h2
2Q dh
)k−1
ǫp(hi)
ǫ
e−
h2i
2Q dhi . (3.32)
Using a similar equation the probability for an erroneous correction of σEi = σ
A
i
can be calculated, too:
P−k =
∫ ∞
0
(
2√
2πQ
)K (∫ ∞
hi
1− ǫp(h)
1− ǫ e
− h
2
2Q dh
)K−k−1
×
(∫ ∞
hi
ǫp(h)
ǫ
e−
h2
2Q dh
)k
1− ǫp(hi)
1− ǫ e
−
h2i
2Q dhi . (3.33)
Taking all possible internal representations of A’s and E’s neural networks
into account, the probability of repulsive steps consists of three parts in the case
of the geometric attack.
• If the number of hidden units with σEi 6= σAi is even, no geometric correction
happens at all. This is similar to bidirectional synchronization, so that one
finds
PEr,1 =
K/2∑
i=1
(
K − 1
2i− 1
)
(1− ǫ)K−2i ǫ2i . (3.34)
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• It is possible that the hidden unit with the minimum |hEi | has the same
output as its counterpart in A’s Tree Parity Machine. Then the geomet-
ric correction increases the deviation of the internal representations. The
second part of PEr takes this event into account:
PEr,2 =
K/2∑
i=1
(
K − 1
2i− 1
)
P−2i−1 (1− ǫ)K−2i+1 ǫ2i−1 . (3.35)
• Similarly the geometric attack does not fix a deviation in the i-th hidden
unit, if the output of another one is flipped instead. Indeed, this causes a
repulsive step with probability
PEr,3 =
(K−1)/2∑
i=0
(
K − 1
2i
)
(1− P+2i+1)(1− ǫ)K−2i−1 ǫ2i+1 . (3.36)
Thus the probabilities of attractive and repulsive steps in the i-th hidden unit
for K > 1 and identical order parameters are given by
PEa =
1
2
(
1−
3∑
j=1
PEr,j
)
, (3.37)
PEr =
3∑
j=1
PEr,j . (3.38)
In the case K = 1, however, only attractive steps occur, because the algorithm
of the geometric attack is then able to correct all deviations. And especially for
K = 3 one can calculate these probabilities using (3.31) instead of the general
equations, which yields [22]
PEa =
1
2
(1 + 2Pg)(1− ǫ)2ǫ+ 1
2
(1− ǫ)3
+
1
2
(1− ǫ)ǫ2 + 1
6
ǫ3 (3.39)
PEr = 2(1− Pg)(1− ǫ)2ǫ+ 2(1− ǫ)ǫ2 +
2
3
ǫ3 . (3.40)
As shown in figure 3.9 PEr grows, if the number of hidden units is increased. It
is even possible that the geometric attack performs worse than the simple attack
at the beginning of the synchronization process (ǫ ≈ 0.5). While this behavior
is similar to that observed in figure 3.7, PEr is still higher than P
B
r for identical
K. Consequently, even this advanced algorithm for unidirectional learning has a
disadvantage compared to bidirectional synchronization, which is clearly visible
in figure 3.10.
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Figure 3.9: Probability of repulsive steps for an attacker using the geometric
attack. The dotted line shows Pr for the simple attack.
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Figure 3.10: Probability of repulsive steps for Tree Parity Machines with K = 3
hidden units and different types of interaction.
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3.3 Dynamics of the weights
In each attractive step corresponding weights of A’s and B’s Tree Parity Machines
move in the same direction, which is chosen with equal probability in the case of
the random walk learning rule. The same is true for Hebbian and anti-Hebbian
learning in the limit N → ∞ as shown in section 3.1.1. Of course, repulsive
steps disturb this synchronization process. But for small overlap they have little
effect, while they occur only seldom in the case of large ρ. That is why one can
neglect repulsive steps in some situations and consequently describe neural syn-
chronization as an ensemble of random walks with reflecting boundaries, driven
by pairwise identical random signals [9, 10].
1 2 m...
d
Figure 3.11: Random walks with reflecting boundaries.
This leads to a simple model for a pair of weights, which is shown in fig-
ure 3.11 [27]. Two random walks corresponding to wAi,j and w
B
i,j can move on a
one-dimensional line with m = 2L + 1 sites. In each step a direction, either left
or right, is chosen randomly. Then the random walkers move in this direction.
If one of them hits the boundary, it is reflected, so that its own position remains
unchanged. As this does not affect the other random walker, which moves to-
wards the first one, the distance d between them shrinks by 1 at each reflection.
Otherwise d remains constant.
The most important quantity of this model is the synchronization time T of
the two random walkers, which is defined as the number of steps needed to reach
d = 0 starting with random initial positions. In order to calculate the mean value
〈T 〉 and analyze the probability distribution P (T = t), this process is divided into
independent parts, each of them with constant distance d. Their duration Sd,z is
given by the time between two reflections. Of course, this quantity depends not
only on the distance d, but also on the initial position z = L+min(wAi,j, w
B
i,j) + 1
of the left random walker.
3.3.1 Waiting time for a reflection
If the first move is to the right, a reflection only occurs for z = m−d. Otherwise,
the synchronization process continues as if the initial position had been z + 1.
In this case the average number of steps with distance d is given by 〈Sd,z+1 + 1〉.
Similarly, if the two random walkers move to the left in the first step, this quantity
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is equal to 〈Sd,z−1 + 1〉. Averaging over both possibilities leads to the following
difference equation [27]:
〈Sd,z〉 = 1
2
〈Sd,z−1〉+ 1
2
〈Sd,z+1〉+ 1 . (3.41)
Reflections are only possible, if the current position z is either 1 or m− d. In
both situations d changes with probability 1
2
in the next step, which is taken into
account by using the boundary conditions
Sd,0 = 0 and Sd,m−d+1 = 0 . (3.42)
As (3.41) is identical to the classical ruin problem [32], its solution is given by
〈Sd,z〉 = (m− d+ 1)z − z2 . (3.43)
In order to calculate the standard deviation of the synchronization time an
additional difference equation,
〈S2d,z〉 =
1
2
〈(Sd,z−1 + 1)2〉+ 1
2
〈(Sd,z+1 + 1)2〉 , (3.44)
is necessary, which can be obtained in a similar manner as equation (3.41). Using
both (3.43) and (3.44) leads to the relation [27]
〈S2d,z〉 − 〈Sd,z〉2 =
〈S2d,z−1〉 − 〈Sd,z−1〉2
2
+
〈S2d,z+1〉 − 〈Sd,z+1〉2
2
+ (m− d+ 1− 2z)2 (3.45)
for the variance of Sd,z. Applying a Z-transformation finally yields the solution
〈S2d,z〉 − 〈Sd,z〉2 =
(m− d+ 1− z)2 + z2 − 2
3
〈Sd,z〉 . (3.46)
While the first two moments of Sd,z are sufficient to calculate the mean value
and the standard deviation of T , the probability distribution P (Sd,z = t) must
be known in order to further analyze P (T = t). For that purpose a result known
from the solution of the classical ruin problem [32] is used: The probability that
a fair game ends with the ruin of one player in time step t is given by
u(t) =
1
a
a−1∑
k=1
sin
(
kπz
a
)[
sin
(
kπ
a
)
+ sin
(
kπ − kπ
a
)][
cos
(
kπ
a
)]t−1
. (3.47)
In the random walk model a−1 = m−d denotes the number of possible positions
for two random walkers with distance d. And u(t) is the probability distribution
of the random variable Sd,z. As before, z = L + min(w
A
i,j, w
B
i,j) + 1 denotes the
initial position of the left random walker.
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3.3.2 Synchronization of two random walks
With these results one can determine the properties of the synchronization time
Td,z for two random walks starting at position z and distance d. After the first
reflection at time Sd,z one of the random walkers is located at the boundary. As
the model is symmetric, both possibilities z = 1 or z = m− d are equal. Hence
the second reflection takes place after Sd,z + Sd−1,1 steps and, consequently, the
total synchronization time is given by
Td,z = Sd,z +
d−1∑
j=1
Sj,1 . (3.48)
Using (3.43) leads to [27]
〈Td,z〉 = (m− d+ 1)z − z2 + 1
2
(d− 1)(2m− d) (3.49)
for the expectation value of this random variable. In a similar manner one can
calculate the variance of Td,z, because the parts of the synchronization process
are mutually independent.
Finally, one has to average over all possible initial conditions in order to
determine the mean value and the standard deviation of the synchronization
time T for randomly chosen starting positions of the two random walkers [27]:
〈T 〉 = 2
m2
m−1∑
d=1
m−d∑
z=1
〈Td,z〉 = (m− 1)
2
3
+
m− 1
3m
, (3.50)
〈T 2〉 = 2
m2
m−1∑
d=1
m−d∑
z=1
〈T 2d,z〉
=
17m5 − 51m4 + 65m3 − 45m2 + 8m+ 6
90m
. (3.51)
Thus the average number of attractive steps required to reach a synchronized
state, which is shown in figure 3.12, increases nearly proportional to m2. In
particular for large system sizes m the asymptotic behavior is given by
〈T 〉 ∼ 1
3
m2 ∼ 4
3
L2 . (3.52)
As shown later in section 3.4.1 this result is consistent with the scaling behavior
〈tsync〉 ∝ L2 found in the case of neural synchronization [16].
In numerical simulations, both for random walks and neural networks, large
fluctuations of the synchronization time are observed. The reason for this effect
is that not only the mean value but also the standard deviation of T [27],
σT =
√
7m6 − 11m5 − 15m4 + 55m3 − 72m2 + 46m− 10
90m2
, (3.53)
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Figure 3.12: Synchronization time of two random walks as a function of the
system size m = 2L + 1. Error bars denote the standard deviation observed in
1000 simulations. The analytical solution (3.50) is plotted as dashed curve.
increases with the extension m of the random walks. A closer look at (3.52) and
(3.53) reveals that σT is asymptotically proportional to 〈T 〉:
σT ∼
√
7
10
〈T 〉 . (3.54)
Therefore the relative fluctuations σT /〈T 〉 are nearly independent of m and not
negligible. Consequently, one cannot assume a typical synchronization time, but
has to take the full distribution P (T = t) into account.
3.3.3 Probability distribution
As Td,z is the sum over Si,j for each distance i from d to 1 according to (3.48), its
probability distribution P(Td,z = t) is a convolution of d functions u(t) defined in
(3.47). The convolution of two different geometric sequences bn = b
n and cn = c
n
is itself a linear combination of these sequences:
bn ∗ cn =
n−1∑
j=1
bjcn−j =
c
b− c bn +
b
c− b cn . (3.55)
Thus P(Td,z = t) can be written as a sum over geometric sequences, too:
P(Td,z = t) =
m∑
a=m−d+1
a−1∑
k=1
cd,za,k
[
cos
(
kπ
a
)]t−1
. (3.56)
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Figure 3.13: Value of the coefficients cm,1 and cm,m−1 as a function of m. The
approximation given in (3.62) is shown as dashed curve.
In order to obtain P(T = t) for random initial conditions, one has to average
over all possible starting positions of both random walkers. But even this result
P(T = t) =
2
m2
m−1∑
d=1
m−d∑
z=1
P(Td,z = t) (3.57)
can be written as a sum over a lot of geometric sequences:
P(T = t) =
m∑
a=2
a−1∑
k=1
ca,k
[
cos
(
kπ
a
)]t−1
. (3.58)
For long times, however, only the terms with the largest absolute value of the
coefficient cos(kπ/a) are relevant, because the others decline exponentially faster.
Hence one can neglect them in the limit t→∞, so that the asymptotic behavior
of the probability distribution is given by
P(T = t) ∼ [cm,1 + (−1)t−1cm,m−1]
[
cos
( π
m
)]t−1
. (3.59)
The two coefficients cm,1 and cm,m−1 in this equation can be calculated using
(3.55). This leads to the following result [27], which is shown in figure 3.13:
cm,1 =
sin2(π/m)
m2m!
m−1∑
d=1
2d+1(m− d)!
1− δd,1 cos(π/m)
×
m−1∏
a=m−d+1
a−1∑
k=1
sin2(kπ/2)
cos(π/m)− cos(kπ/a)
sin2(kπ/a)
1− δa,m−d+1 cos(kπ/a) ,(3.60)
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Figure 3.14: Probability distribution P(T = t) of the synchronization time for
m = 7 (L = 3). The numerical result is plotted as full curve. The dashed line
denotes the asymptotic function defined in (3.63).
cm,m−1 =
sin2(π/m) cos2(mπ/2)
m2m!
m−1∑
d=1
(−1)d−1 2
d+1(m− d)!
1 + δd,1 cos(π/m)
×
m−1∏
a=m−d+1
a−1∑
k=1
sin2(kπ/2)
cos(π/m) + cos(kπ/a)
sin2(kπ/a)
1− δa,m−d+1 cos(kπ/a) .(3.61)
As the value of cm,m−1 is given by an alternating sum, this coefficient is much
smaller than cm,1. Additionally, it is exactly zero for odd values of m because of
the factor cos2(mπ/2). The other coefficient cm,1, however, can be approximated
by [27]
cm,1 ≈ 0.324m
[
1− cos
( π
m
)]
(3.62)
for m≫ 1, which is clearly visible in figure 3.13, too.
In the case of neural synchronization, m = 2L + 1 is always odd, so that
cm,m−1 = 0. Here P(T = t) asymptotically converges to a geometric probability
distribution for long synchronization times:
P(T = t) ∼ cm,1
[
cos
( π
m
)]t−1
. (3.63)
Figure 3.14 shows that this analytical solution describes P (T = t) well, except
for some deviations at the beginning of the synchronization process. But for
small values of t one can use the equations of motion for pa,b in order to calculate
P (T = t) iteratively.
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Figure 3.15: Average synchronization time 〈TN〉 as a function of N for m = 7
(L = 3). Results of the numerical calculation using (3.64) are represented by
circles. The dashed line shows the expectation value of TN calculated in (3.69).
3.3.4 Extreme order statistics
In this section the model is extended to N independent pairs of random walks
driven by identical random noise. This corresponds to two hidden units with N
weights, which start uncorrelated and reach full synchronization after TN attrac-
tive steps.
Although 〈T 〉 is the mean value of the synchronization time for a pair of
weights, wAi,j and w
B
i,j, it is not equal to 〈TN〉. The reason is that the weight vectors
have to be completely identical in the case of full synchronization. Therefore TN
is the maximum value of T observed in N independent samples corresponding to
the different weights of a hidden unit.
As the distribution function P(T ≤ t) is known, the probability distribution
of TN is given by
P(TN ≤ t) = P(T ≤ t)N . (3.64)
Hence one can calculate the average value 〈TN〉 using the numerically com-
puted distribution P(TN ≤ t). The result, which is shown in figure 3.15, indicates
that 〈TN〉 increases logarithmically with the number of pairs of random walkers:
〈TN〉 − 〈T 〉 ∝ lnN . (3.65)
For large N only the asymptotic behavior of P(T ≤ t) is relevant for the
distribution of TN . The exponential decay of P(T = t) according to (3.59) yields
a Gumbel distribution for P(TN ≤ t) [33],
G(t) = exp
(
−e ta−ttb
)
, (3.66)
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for N ≫ m with the parameters
ta = tb ln
Ncm,1
1− cos(π/m) and tb = −
1
ln cos(π/m)
. (3.67)
Substituting (3.67) into (3.66) yields [27]
P(TN ≤ t) = exp
(
−Ncm,1 cos
t(π/m)
1− cos(π/m)
)
(3.68)
as the distribution function for the total synchronization time of N pairs of ran-
dom walks (N ≫ m). The expectation value of this probability distribution is
given by [33]
〈TN〉 = ta + tbγ = − 1
ln cos(π/m)
(
γ + lnN + ln
cm,1
1− cos(π/m)
)
. (3.69)
Here γ denotes the Euler-Mascheroni constant. For N ≫ m≫ 1 the asymptotic
behavior of the synchronization time is given by
〈TN〉 ∼ 2
π2
m2
(
γ + lnN + ln
2m2 cm,1
π2
)
. (3.70)
Using (3.62) finally leads to the result [27]
〈TN〉 ≈ 2
π2
m2 (lnN + ln(0.577m)) , (3.71)
which shows that 〈TN〉 increases proportional to m2 lnN .
Of course, neural synchronization is somewhat more complex than this model
using random walks driven by pairwise identical noise. Because of the structure
of the learning rules the weights are not changed in each step. Including these idle
steps certainly increases the synchronization time tsync. Additionally, repulsive
steps destroying synchronization are possible, too. Nevertheless, a similar scaling
law 〈tsync〉 ∝ L2 lnN can be observed for the synchronization of two Tree Parity
Machines as long as repulsive effects have only little influence on the dynamics
of the system.
3.4 Random walk of the overlap
The most important order parameter of the synchronization process is the over-
lap between the weight vectors of the participating neural networks. The results
of section 3.1 and section 3.2 indicate that its change over time can be described
by a random walk with position dependent step sizes, 〈∆ρa〉, 〈∆ρr〉, and tran-
sition probabilities, Pa, Pr [31]. Of course, only the transition probabilities are
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Figure 3.16: Average change of the overlap for K = 3, L = 5, and random walk
learning rule. Symbols denote results obtained from 1000 simulations, while the
lines have been calculated using (3.72).
exact functions of ρ, while the step sizes fluctuate randomly around their average
values. Consequently, this model is not suitable for quantitative predictions, but
nevertheless one can determine important properties regarding the qualitative
behavior of the system. For this purpose, the average change of the overlap
〈∆ρ〉 = Pa(ρ)〈∆ρa(ρ)〉+ Pr(ρ)〈∆ρr(ρ)〉 (3.72)
in one synchronization step as a function of ρ is especially useful.
Figure 3.16 clearly shows the difference between synchronization and learning
for K = 3. In the case of bidirectional interaction, 〈∆ρ〉 is always positive
until the process reaches the absorbing state at ρ = 1. But for unidirectional
interaction, there is a fixed point at ρf < 1. That is why a further increase of
the overlap is only possible by fluctuations. Consequently, there are two different
types of dynamics, which play a role in the process of synchronization.
3.4.1 Synchronization on average
If 〈∆ρ〉 is always positive for ρ < 1, each update of the weights has an attractive
effect on average. In this case repulsive steps delay the process of synchronization,
but the dynamics is dominated by the effect of attractive steps. Therefore it is
similar to that of random walks discussed in section 3.3.
As shown in figure 3.17 the distribution of the overlap gets closer to the
absorbing state at ρ = 1 in each time step. And the velocity of this process
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Figure 3.17: Distribution of the overlap in different time steps. These results were
obtained in 100 simulations for synchronization with K = 3, L = 5, N = 100,
and random walk learning rule.
is determined by 〈∆ρ〉. That is why ρ increases fast at the beginning of the
synchronization, but more slowly towards the end.
However, the average change of the overlap depends on the synaptic depth L,
too. While the transition probabilities Pa and Pr are unaffected by a change of L,
the step sizes 〈∆ρa〉 and 〈∆ρr〉 shrink proportional to L−2 according to (3.16) and
(3.18). Hence 〈∆ρ〉 also decreases proportional to L−2 so that a large synaptic
depth slows down the dynamics. That is why one expects
〈tsync〉 ∝ 1〈∆ρ〉 ∝ L
2 (3.73)
for the scaling of the synchronization time.
In fact, the probability P (tsync ≤ t) to achieve identical weight vectors in
A’s and B’s neural networks in at most t steps is described well by a Gumbel
distribution (3.66):
PBsync(t) = exp
(
−e ta−ttb
)
. (3.74)
Similar to the model in section 3.3 the parameters ta and tb increase both pro-
portional to L2, which is clearly visible in figure 3.18. Consequently, the average
synchronization time scales like 〈tsync〉 ∝ L2 lnN , in agreement with (3.71).
Additionally, figure 3.17 indicates that large fluctuations of the overlap can
be observed during the process of neural synchronization. For t = 0 the width of
the distribution is due to the finite number of weights and vanishes in the limit
N →∞. But later fluctuations are mainly amplified by the interplay of discrete
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Figure 3.18: Probability distribution of the synchronization time for two Tree
Parity Machines with K = 3, L = 3, N = 1000, and random walk learning rule.
The histogram shows the relative frequency of occurrence observed in 10 000
simulations and the thick curve represents a fit of the Gumbel distribution. Fit
parameters for different values of L are shown in the inset.
attractive and repulsive steps. This effect cannot be avoided by increasing N ,
because this does not change the step sizes. Therefore the order parameter ρ is
not a self-averaging quantity [34]: one cannot replace ρ by 〈ρ〉 in the equations
of motion in order to calculate the time evolution of the overlap analytically.
Instead, the whole probability distribution of the weights has to be taken into
account.
3.4.2 Synchronization by fluctuations
If there is a fixed point at ρf < 1, then the dynamics of neural synchronization
changes drastically. As long as ρ < ρf the overlap increases on average. But then
a quasi-stationary state is reached. Further synchronization is only possible by
fluctuations, which are caused by the discrete nature of attractive and repulsive
steps.
Figure 3.19 shows both the initial transient and the quasi-stationary state.
The latter can be described by a normal distribution with average value ρf and
a standard deviation σf .
In order to determine the scaling of the fluctuations, a linear approximation
of 〈∆ρ(ρ)〉 is used as a simple model [31],
∆ρ(t) = −αf(ρ(t)− ρf) + βfξ(t) , (3.75)
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Figure 3.19: Distribution of the overlap in different time steps. These results
were obtained in 100 simulations for the geometric attack with K = 3, L = 5,
N = 100, and random walk learning rule.
without taking the boundary conditions into account. Here the ξ(t) are random
numbers with zero mean and unit variance. The two parameters are defined as
αf = − d
dρ
〈∆ρ(ρ)〉
∣∣∣∣
ρ=ρf
, (3.76)
βf =
√
〈(∆ρ(ρf))2〉 . (3.77)
In this model, the solution of (3.75),
ρ(t + 1)− ρf = βf
t∑
i=0
(1− αf)t−iξ(i) , (3.78)
describes the time evolution of the overlap. Here the initial condition ρ(0) = ρf
was assumed, which is admittedly irrelevant in the limit t→∞. Calculating the
variance of the overlap in the stationary state yields [31]
σ2f = β
2
f
∞∑
t=0
(1− αf)2t = β
2
f
2αf − α2f
. (3.79)
As the step sizes of the random walk in ρ-space decrease proportional to L−2
for L≫ 1 according to (3.16) and (3.18), this is also the scaling behavior of the
parameters αf and βf . Thus one finds
σf ∝ 1
L
(3.80)
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Figure 3.20: Standard deviation of ρ at the fixed point for K = 3, N = 1000,
random walk learning rule, and unidirectional synchronization, averaged over
10 000 simulations. The inset shows the position of the fixed point.
for larger values of the synaptic depth. Although this simple model does not
include the more complex features of 〈∆ρ(ρ)〉, its scaling behavior is clearly re-
produced in figure 3.20. Deviations for small values of L are caused by finite-size
effects.
Consequently, E is unable to synchronize with A and B in the limit L→∞,
even if she uses the geometric attack. This is also true for any other algorithm
resulting in a dynamics of the overlap, which has a fixed point at ρf < 1.
For finite synaptic depth, however, the attacker has a chance of getting beyond
the fixed point at ρf by fluctuations. The probability that this event occurs in any
given step is independent of t, once the quasi-stationary state has been reached.
Thus PEsync(t) is not given by a Gumbel distribution (3.66), but described well for
t≫ t0 by an exponential distribution,
PEsync(t) = 1− e−
t−t0
tf , (3.81)
with time constant tf . This is clearly visible in figure 3.21. Because of tf ≫ t0
one needs
〈tsync〉 ≈
{
tf e
t0/tf for t0 < 0
tf + t0 for t0 ≥ 0
}
≈ tf (3.82)
steps on average to reach ρ = 1 using unidirectional learning.
In the simplified model [31] with linear 〈∆ρ(ρ)〉 the mean time needed to
achieve full synchronization starting at the fixed point is given by
tf ≈ 1
P (ρ = 1)
=
√
2πσfe
(1−ρf )
2
2σ2
f (3.83)
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Figure 3.21: Probability distribution of tsync for K = 3, N = 1000, random walk
learning rule, and geometric attack. Symbols denote results averaged over 1000
simulations and the lines show fits with (3.81).
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Figure 3.22: Time constant tf for synchronization by fluctuations. Symbols de-
note results obtained in 1000 simulations of the geometric attack for K = 3,
N = 1000, and random walk learning rule. The line shows a fit with (3.85).
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as long as the fluctuations are small. If σf ≪ 1−ρf , the assumption is reasonable,
that the distribution of ρ is not influenced by the presence of the absorbing state
at ρ = 1. Hence one expects
tf ∝ ecL2 (3.84)
for the scaling of the time constant, as σf changes proportional to L
−1, while ρf
stays nearly constant. And figure 3.22 shows that indeed tf grows exponentially
with increasing synaptic depth:
tf ∝ ec1L+c2L2 . (3.85)
Thus the partners A and B can control the complexity of attacks on the neural
key-exchange protocol by choosing L. Or if E’s effort stays constant, her success
probability drops exponentially with increasing synaptic depth. As shown in
chapter 4, this effect can be observed in the case of the geometric attack [16] and
even for advanced methods [22, 23].
3.5 Synchronization time
As shown before the scaling of the average synchronization time 〈tsync〉 with re-
gard to the synaptic depth L depends on the function 〈∆ρ(ρ)〉 which is different
for bidirectional and unidirectional interaction. However, one has to consider
two other parameters. The probability of repulsive steps Pr depends not only
on the interaction, but also on the number of hidden units. Therefore one can
switch between synchronization on average and synchronization by fluctuations
by changing K, which is the topic of section 3.5.1. Additionally, the chosen learn-
ing rule influences the step sizes of attractive and repulsive steps. Section 3.5.2
shows that this affects 〈∆ρ(ρ)〉 and consequently the average synchronization
time 〈tsync〉, too.
3.5.1 Number of hidden units
As long as K ≤ 3, A and B are able to synchronize on average. In this case 〈tsync〉
increases proportional to L2. In contrast, E can only synchronize by fluctuations
as soon as K > 1, so that for her 〈tsync〉 grows exponentially with the synaptic
depth L. Consequently, A and B can reach any desired level of security by
choosing a suitable value for L.
However, this is not true for K > 3. As shown in figure 3.23, a fixed point at
ρf < 1 appears in the case of bidirectional synchronization, too. Therefore (3.73)
is not valid any more and 〈tsync〉 now increases exponentially with L. This is
clearly visible in figure 3.24. Consequently, Tree Parity Machines with four and
more hidden units cannot be used in the neural key-exchange protocol, except if
the synaptic depth is very small.
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Figure 3.23: Average change of the overlap for L = 10, N = 1000, random walk
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from 100 simulations, while the lines have been calculated using (3.72).
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Figure 3.25: Synchronization time for bidirectional interaction, N = 1000, and
random walk learning rule, averaged over 1000 simulations.
Figure 3.25 shows the transition between the two mechanisms of synchroniza-
tion clearly. As long as K ≤ 3 the scaling law 〈tsync〉 ∝ L2 is valid, so that
the constant of proportionality 〈tsync〉/L2 is independent of the number of hidden
units. Additionally, it increases proportional to lnKN , as the total number of
weights in a Tree Parity Machine is given by KN .
In contrast, 〈tsync〉 ∝ L2 is not valid for K > 3. In this case 〈tsync〉/L2 still
increases proportional to lnKN , but the steepness of the curve depends on the
synaptic depth, as the fluctuations of the overlap decrease proportional to L−1.
Consequently, there are two sets of parameters, which allow for synchronization
using bidirectional interaction in a reasonable number of steps: the absorbing
state ρ = 1 is reached on average for K ≤ 3, whereas large enough fluctuations
drive the process of synchronization in the case of L ≤ 3 and K ≥ 4. Otherwise,
a huge number of steps is needed to achieve full synchronization.
3.5.2 Learning rules
Although the qualitative properties of neural synchronization are independent of
the chosen learning rule, one can observe quantitative deviations for Hebbian and
anti-Hebbian learning in terms of finite-size effects. Of course, these disappear in
the limit L/
√
N → 0.
As shown in section 3.1 Hebbian learning enhances the effects of both repulsive
and attractive steps. This results in a decrease of 〈∆ρ〉 for small overlap, where
a lot of repulsive steps occur. But if A’s and B’s Tree Parity Machines are nearly
synchronized, attractive steps prevail, so that the average change of the overlap
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Figure 3.27: Synchronization time for bidirectional interaction and K = 3. Sym-
bols denote results averaged over 10 000 simulations and the line shows the cor-
responding fit from figure 3.24 for the random walk learning rule.
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is increased compared to the random walk learning rule. This is clearly visible
in figure 3.26. Of course, anti-Hebbian learning reduces both step sizes and one
observes the opposite effect.
However, the average synchronization time 〈tsync〉 is mainly influenced by the
transition from ρ ≈ 1 to ρ = 1, which is the slowest part of the synchroniza-
tion process. Therefore Hebbian learning decreases the average number of steps
needed to achieve full synchronization. This effect is clearly visible in figure 3.27.
In contrast, anti-Hebbian learning increases 〈tsync〉. Here finite-size effects
cause problems for bidirectional synchronization, because one can even observe
〈∆ρ〉 < 0 for K = 3, if L/√N is just sufficiently large. Then the synchronization
time increases faster than L2. Consequently, this learning rule is only usable
in large systems, where finite-size effects are small and the observed behavior is
similar to that of the random walk learning rule.
Chapter 4
Security of neural cryptography
The security of the neural key-exchange protocol is based on the phenomenon
analyzed in chapter 2: two Tree Parity Machines interacting with each other
synchronize much faster than a third neural network trained using their inputs
and outputs as examples. In fact, the effort of the partners grows only polyno-
mially with increasing synaptic depth, while the complexity of an attack scales
exponentially with L.
However, neural synchronization is a stochastic process driven by random
attractive and repulsive forces [19]. Therefore A and B are not always faster
than E, but there is a small probability PE that an attacker is successful before
the partners have finished the key exchange. Because of the different dynamics
PE drops exponentially with increasing L, so that the system is secure in the
limit L → ∞ [16]. And in practise, one can reach any desired level of security
by just increasing L, while the effort of generating a key only grows moderately
[22].
Although this mechanism works perfectly, if the parameters of the protocol are
chosen correctly, other values can lead to an insecure key exchange [21]. Therefore
it is necessary to determine the scaling of PE for different configurations and all
known attack methods. By doing so, one can form an estimate regarding the
minimum synaptic depth needed for some practical applications, too.
While PE directly shows whether neural cryptography is secure, it does not
reveal the cause of this observation. For that purpose, it is useful to analyze
the mutual information I gained by partners and attackers during the process
of synchronization. Even though all participants receive the same messages, A
and B can select the most useful ones for adjusting the weights. That is why
they learn more about each other than E, who is only listening. Consequently,
bidirectional interaction gives an advantage to the partners, which cannot be
exploited by a passive attacker.
Of course, E could try other methods instead of learning by listening. Es-
pecially in the case of a brute-force attack, security depends on the number
of possible keys, which can be generated by the neural key-exchange protocol.
55
56 4. Security of neural cryptography
Therefore it is important to analyze the scaling of this quantity, too.
4.1 Success probability
Attacks which are based on learning by listening have in common that the op-
ponent E tries to synchronize one or more Tree Parity Machines with A’s and
B’s neural networks. Of course, after the partners have reached identical weight
vectors, they stop the process of synchronization, so that the number of available
examples for the attack is limited. Therefore E’s online learning is only successful,
if she discovers the key before A and B finish the key exchange.
As synchronization of neural networks is a stochastic process, there is a small
probability that E synchronizes faster with A than B. In actual fact, one could
use this quantity directly to describe the security of the key-exchange protocol.
However, the partners may not detect full synchronization immediately, so that
E is even successful, if she achieves her goal shortly afterwards. Therefore PE
is defined as the probability that the attacker knows 98 per cent of the weights
at synchronization time. Additionally, this definition reduces fluctuations in the
simulations, which are employed to determine PE [16].
4.1.1 Attacks using a single neural network
For both the simple attack and the geometric attack E only needs one Tree Parity
Machine. So the complexity of these methods is small. But as already shown in
section 3.4.2 E can only synchronize by fluctuations if K > 1, while the partners
synchronize on average as long as K ≤ 3. That is why tEsync is usually much larger
than tBsync for K = 2 and K = 3. In fact, the probability of t
E
sync ≤ tBsync in this
case is given by
P (tEsync ≤ tBsync) =
∫ ∞
t=0
PEsync(t)
d
dt
PBsync(t) dt (4.1)
under the assumption that the two synchronization times are uncorrelated ran-
dom variables. In this equation PBsync(t) and P
E
sync(t) are the cumulative prob-
ability distributions of the synchronization time defined in (3.74) and (3.81),
respectively.
In order to approximate this probability one has to look especially at the
fluctuations of the synchronization times tBsync and t
E
sync. The width of the Gumbel
distribution, √
〈(tBsync)2〉 − 〈tBsync〉2 =
π√
6
tb , (4.2)
for A and B is much smaller than the standard deviation of the exponential
distribution, √
〈(tEsync)2〉 − 〈tEsync〉2 = tf , (4.3)
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Figure 4.1: Success probability of the geometric attack as a function of L. Sym-
bols denote results obtained in 10 000 simulations with N = 1000 and random
walk learning rule, while the lines represent fit results for model (4.7).
for E because of tf ≫ tb. Therefore one can approximate PBsync(t) in integral (4.1)
by Θ(t− 〈tBsync〉), which leads to
P (tEsync ≤ tBsync) ≈ 1− exp
(
−〈t
B
sync〉
〈tEsync〉
)
. (4.4)
Hence the success probability of an attack depends on the ratio of both average
synchronization times,
〈tBsync〉
〈tEsync〉
∝ L
2
ec1L+c2L2
, (4.5)
which are functions of the synaptic depth L according to (3.73) and (3.85). Con-
sequently, L is the most important parameter for the security of the neural key-
exchange protocol.
In the case of L ≫ 1 the ratio 〈tBsync〉/〈tEsync〉 becomes very small, so that a
further approximation of (4.4) is possible. This yields the result
P (tEsync ≤ tBsync) ∝ L2e−c1Le−c2L
2
, (4.6)
which describes the asymptotic behavior of the success probability: if A and B
increase the synaptic depth of their Tree Parity Machines, the success probability
of an attack drops exponentially [16]. Thus the partners can achieve any desired
level of security by changing L.
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Figure 4.2: Success probability PE of the geometric attack as a function of K.
Symbols denote results obtained in 1000 simulations using the random walk learn-
ing rule and N = 1000.
Although PE is not exactly identical to P (t
E
sync ≤ tBsync) because of its defini-
tion, it has the expected scaling behavior,
PE ∝ e−y1L−y2L2 , (4.7)
which is clearly visible in figure 4.1. However, the coefficients y1 and y2 are
different from c1 and c2 due to interfering correlations between t
B
sync and t
E
sync,
which have been neglected in the derivation of P (tEsync ≤ tBsync).
Additionally, figure 4.1 shows that the success probability of the geometric
attack depends not only on the synaptic depth L, but also on the number of
hidden units K. This effect, which results in different values of the coefficients,
is caused by a limitation of the algorithm: the output of at most one hidden unit
is corrected in each step. While this is sufficient to avoid all repulsive steps in
the case K = 1, there can be several hidden units with σEi 6= σAi for K > 1. And
the probability for this event grows with increasing K, so that more and more
repulsive steps occur in E’s neural network.
Consequently, A and B can achieve security against this attack not only by
increasing the synaptic depth L, but also by using a greater number of hidden
units K. Of course, for K > 3 large values of L are not possible, as the process of
synchronization is then driven by fluctuations. Nevertheless, figure 4.2 shows that
the success probability PE for the geometric attack drops quickly with increasing
K even in the case L = 1.
As the geometric attack is an element of both advanced attacks, majority
attack and genetic attack, one can also defeat these methods by increasing K.
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Figure 4.3: Success probability PE of the simple attack as a function of K. Sym-
bols denote results obtained in 1000 simulations using the random walk learning
rule and N = 1000.
But then synchronization by mutual interaction and learning by listening become
more and more similar. Thus one has to look at the success probability of the
simple attack, too.
As this method does not correct the outputs σEi of the hidden units at all,
the distance between the fixed point at ρf < 1 of the dynamics and the absorbing
state at ρ = 1 is greater than in the case of the geometric attack. That is why
a simple attacker needs larger fluctuations to synchronize and is less successful
than the more advanced attack as long as the number of hidden units is small.
In principle, scaling law (4.7) is also valid for this method. But one cannot
find a single successful simple attack in 1000 simulations using the parameters
K = 3 and L = 3 [13]. This is clearly visible in figure 4.3. Consequently, the
simple attack is not sufficient to break the security of the neural key-exchange
protocol for K ≤ 3.
But learning by listening without any correction works if the number of hid-
den units is large. Here the probability of repulsive steps is similar for both
bidirectional and unidirectional interaction as shown in section 3.2. That is why
PE approaches a non-zero constant value in the limit K →∞.
These results show that K = 3 is the optimal choice for the cryptographic
application of neural synchronization. K = 1 and K = 2 are too insecure in
regard to the geometric attack. And for K > 3 the effort of A and B grows
exponentially with increasing L, while the simple attack is quite successful in the
limit K → ∞. Consequently, one should only use Tree Parity Machines with
three hidden units for the neural key-exchange protocol.
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4.1.2 Genetic attack
In the case of the genetic attack E’s success depends mainly on the ability to
determine the fitness of her neural networks. Of course, the best quantity for
this purpose would be the overlap ρAE between an attacking network and A’s
Tree Parity Machine. However, it is not available, as E only knows the weight
vectors of her own networks. Instead the attacker uses the frequency of the event
τE = τA in recent steps, which gives a rough estimate of ρAE .
Therefore a selection step only works correctly, if there are clear differences
between attractive and repulsive effects. As the step sizes 〈∆ρa〉 and 〈∆ρr〉 de-
crease proportional to L−2, distinguishing both step types becomes more and
more complicated for E. Thus one expects a similar asymptotic behavior of PE
in the limit L→∞ as observed before.
Figure 4.4 shows that this is indeed the case. The success probability drops
exponentially with increasing synaptic depth L,
PE ∼ e−y(L−L0) , (4.8)
as long as L > L0 [22]. But for L < L0 E is nearly always successful. Conse-
quently, A and B have to use Tree Parity Machines with large synaptic depth in
order to secure the key-exchange protocol against this attack.
In contrast to the geometric method, E is able to improve her success probabil-
ity by increasing the maximum number of networks used for the genetic attack.
As shown in figure 4.5 this changes L0, but the coefficient y remains approxi-
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number of attackers M . Symbols denote the results obtained in figure 4.4 for
K = 3, N = 1000, and random walk learning rule.
mately constant. However, it is a logarithmic effect:
L0(M) = L0(1) + LE lnM . (4.9)
That is why the attacker has to increase the number of her Tree Parity Machines
exponentially,
M ∝ eL/LE (4.10)
in order to compensate a change of L and maintain a constant success probabil-
ity PE. But the effort needed to generate a key only increases proportional to
L2. Consequently, the neural key-exchange protocol is secure against the genetic
attack in the limit L→∞.
4.1.3 Majority attack
An opponent who has an ensemble of M Tree Parity Machines, can also use the
majority attack to improve PE . This method does neither generate variants nor
select the fittest networks, so that their number remains constant throughout
the process of synchronization. Instead the majority decision of the M Tree
Parity Machines determines the internal representation (σE1 , . . . , σ
E
K) used for the
purpose of learning. Therefore this algorithm implements, in fact, the optimal
Bayes learning rule [28, 35, 36].
In order to describe the state of the ensemble one can use two order parame-
ters. First, the mean value of the overlap between corresponding hidden units in
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A’s and E’s neural networks,
ρAEi =
1
M
M∑
m=1
wAi ·wE,mi
||wAi || ||wE,mi ||
, (4.11)
indicates the level of synchronization. Here the index m denotes the m-th at-
tacking network. Similar to other attacks, E starts without knowledge in regard
to A, so that ρAE = 0 at the beginning. And finally she is successful, if ρAE = 1
is reached.
Second, the average overlap between two attacking networks,
ρEEi =
1
M(M − 1)
M∑
m=1
∑
n 6=m
w
E,m
i ·wE,ni
||wE,mi || ||wE,ni ||
, (4.12)
describes the correlations in E’s ensemble. At the beginning of the synchroniza-
tion ρEE = 0, because all weights are initialized randomly and uncorrelated. But
as soon as ρEE = 1 is reached, E’s networks are identical, so that the performance
of the majority attack is reduced to that of the geometric method.
In the large M limit, the majority vote of the ensemble is identical to the
output values σi of a single neural network, which is located at the center of mass
[35]. Its weight vectors are given by the normalized average over all of E’s Tree
Parity Machines:
w
E,cm
i =
1
M
M∑
m=1
w
E,m
i
||wE,mi ||
. (4.13)
The normalization of wE,mi corresponds to the fact that each member has exactly
one vote. Using (4.11) and (4.12) one can calculate the overlap between the
center of mass and A’s tree Parity Machine:
ρcmi =
wAi ·wE,cmi
||wAi || ||wE,cmi ||
=
ρAEi√
ρEEi +
1
M
(1− ρEEi )
. (4.14)
Consequently, the effective overlap between A and E is given by
ρcmi ∼
ρAEi√
ρEEi
(4.15)
in the limit M → ∞. This result is important for the dynamics of the synchro-
nization process between A and E, because ρcmi replaces ρ
AE
i in the calculation of
the transition probabilities Pa(ρ) and Pr(ρ), whenever the majority vote is used to
adjust the weights. But the step sizes 〈∆ρa(ρ)〉 and 〈∆ρr(ρ)〉 are not affected by
this modification of the algorithm. Therefore the average change of the overlap
between A and E is given by
〈∆ρAEi 〉 = Pa(ρcmi )〈∆ρa(ρAEi )〉+ Pr(ρcmi )〈∆ρr(ρAEi )〉 , (4.16)
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Figure 4.6: Process of synchronization in the case of a majority attack with
M = 100 attacking networks, averaged over 1000 simulations for K = 3, L = 5,
N = 1000, and random walk learning rule.
if the majority vote is used for updating the weight vectors. Although this equa-
tion is strictly correct only in the limit M → ∞, M = 100 is already sufficient
for the majority attack [21].
However, as all attacking networks learn the same internal representation, the
internal overlap ρEEi is increased by the resulting attractive effect:
〈∆ρEEi 〉 =
1
2
〈∆ρa(ρEEi )〉 . (4.17)
Hence ρEEi grows faster than ρ
AE
i in these steps, so that the advantage of the
majority vote decreases whenever it is used [37].
This is clearly visible in figure 4.6. In the first 100 steps the attacker only
uses the geometric attack. Here ρEE ≈ ρAE , which can also be observed for an
ensemble of perceptrons learning according to the Bayes rule [28]. At t = 100,
using the majority vote gives E a huge advantage compared to the geometric
attack, because ρcm ≈
√
ρAE > ρAE, so that the probability of repulsive steps is
reduced. Therefore the attacker is able to maintain ρAE ≈ ρAB for some time.
Later ρEE increases and this benefit vanishes.
However, the attacker is unable to reach full synchronization on average. As
shown in figure 4.7, there is still a fixed point at ρf < 1 in the case of the
majority attack, although its distance to the absorbing state is smaller than for
the geometric attack. Consequently, one expects a higher success probability PE ,
but similar scaling behavior.
Figure 4.8 shows that this is indeed the case for the random walk learning
rule and for anti-Hebbian learning. But if A and B use the Hebbian learning
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Figure 4.8: Success probability PE of the majority attack withM = 100 attacking
networks for K = 3 and N = 1000. Symbols denote results obtained in 10 000
simulations and the line shows the corresponding fit from figure 4.9.
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Figure 4.9: Success probability of different attacks as a function of the synaptic
depth L. Symbols denote results obtained in 1000 simulations using the random
walk learning rule, K = 3, and N = 1000, while the lines show fit results using
model (4.8). The number of attacking networks is M = 4096 for the genetic
attack and M = 100 for the majority attack.
rule instead, PE reaches a constant non-zero value in the limit L → ∞ [21].
Apparently, the change of the weight distribution caused by Hebbian learning is
enough to break the security of the neural key-exchange protocol. Consequently,
A and B cannot use this learning rule for cryptographic purposes.
While anti-Hebbian learning is secure against the majority attack, a lot of
finite size effects occur in smaller systems, which do not fulfill the condition
L ≪ √N . In this case 〈tsync〉 increases faster than L2 as shown in section 3.5.
Fortunately, A and B can avoid this problem by just using the random walk
learning rule.
4.1.4 Comparison of the attacks
As E knows the parameters of the neural key-exchange protocol, she is able to
select the best method for an attack. Consequently, one has to compare the
available attacks in order to determine the maximum of PE.
Figure 4.9 shows the result. Here (4.8) has been used as fit model even for
the geometric attack, which is a special case of both advanced attacks forM = 1.
Of course, by doing so the curvature visible in figure 4.1 is neglected, so that
extrapolating PE for L→∞ overestimates the efficiency of this method.
All three attacks have similar scaling behavior, but the coefficients L0 and
y obtained by fitting with (4.8) depend on the chosen method. The geometric
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attack is the simplest method considered in figure 4.9. Therefore its success
probability is lower than for the more advanced methods. As the exponent y is
large, A and B can easily secure the key-exchange protocol against this method
by just increasing L.
In the case of the majority attack, PE is higher, because the cooperation
between the attacking networks reduces the coefficient y. A and B have to com-
pensate this by further stepping up L. In contrast, the genetic attack merely
increases L0, but y does not change significantly compared to the geometric at-
tack. Therefore the genetic attack is only better if L is not too large. Otherwise
E gains most by using the majority attack [22].
While A and B can reach any desired level of security by increasing the synap-
tic depth, this is difficult to realize in practise. Extrapolation of (4.8) shows
clearly that PE ≈ 10−4 is achieved for K = 3, L = 57, N = 1000, and random
walk learning rule. But the average synchronization time 〈tsync〉 ≈ 1.6 · 105 is
quite large in this case. Consequently, it is reasonable to develop an improved
neural key-exchange protocol [19, 23, 24], which is the topic of chapter 5.
4.2 Security by interaction
The main difference between the partners and the attacker in neural cryptography
is that A and B are able to influence each other by communicating their output
bits τA and τB, while E can only listen to these messages. Of course, A and
B use their advantage to select suitable input vectors for adjusting the weights.
As shown in chapter 3 this finally leads to different synchronization times for
partners and attackers.
However, there are more effects, which show that the two-way communication
between A and B makes attacking the neural key-exchange protocol more difficult
than simple learning of examples. These confirm that the security of neural
cryptography is based on the bidirectional interaction of the partners.
4.2.1 Version space
The time series of pairs (τA, τB) of output bits produced by two interacting Tree
Parity Machines depends not only on the sequence of input vectors xi(t), but
also on the initial weight vectors w
A/B
i (0) of both neural networks. Of course,
E can reproduce the time series τB(t) exactly, if she uses a third Tree Parity
Machine with wEi (0) = w
B
i (0), because the learning rules are deterministic. But
choosing other initial values for the weights in E’s neural network may lead to
the same sequence of output bits. The set of initial configurations with this
property is called version space [28]. Its size nvs is a monotonically decreasing
function of the length t of the sequence, because each new element xi(t) imposes
an additional condition on wEi (0). Of course, it does not matter whether E uses
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Figure 4.10: Version space of interacting Tree Parity Machines with K = 3,
L = 1, N = 2, and random walk learning rule, averaged over 1000 simulations.
the simple attack or the geometric attack, as both algorithms are identical under
the condition τE(t) = τB(t).
Figure 4.10 shows that the size of the version space shrinks by a factor 1/2 in
each step at the beginning of the time series. Here the possible configurations of
the weights are still uniformly distributed, so that each output τB gives one bit
of information about the initial conditions.
But later neural networks which have started with similar weight vectors
synchronize. That is why the configurations are no longer uniformly distributed
and the shrinking of the nvs becomes slower and slower. Finally, all Tree Parity
Machines in the version space have synchronized with each other. From then on
nvs stays constant.
However, the size of the version space in the limit t → ∞ depends on the
properties of the time series. If A and B start fully synchronized, they do not
need to influence each other and all input vectors in the sequence are used to
update the weights. In this case E has to learn randomly chosen examples of a
time-dependent rule [6]. In contrast, if A and B start with uncorrelated weight
vectors, they select a part of the input sequence for adjusting their weights. For
them this interaction increases the speed of the synchronization process, because
only suitable input vectors remain. But it also decreases nvs(t → ∞), so that
imitating B is more difficult for E.
Consequently, the two-way communication between the partners gives them
an advantage, which cannot be exploited by a passive attacker. Therefore bidi-
rectional interaction is important for the security of the neural key-exchange
protocol.
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Figure 4.11: Mutual information between partners and attackers. Symbols denote
simulation results for K = 3, L = 5, N = 1000, and random walk learning rule,
while the lines show the results of corresponding iterative calculations forN →∞.
4.2.2 Mutual information
Instead of using the overlap ρ as order parameter, which is closely related to the
dynamics of the neural networks and the theory of learning, one can look at the
process of synchronization from the point of view of information theory, too. For
this purpose, the mutual information IAB(t) defined in (2.18) describes A’s and
B’s knowledge about each other. Similarly IAE(t) measures, how much informa-
tion E has gained in regard to A at time t by listening to the communication of
the partners.
All participants start with zero knowledge about each other, so that IAB = 0
and IAE = 0 at the beginning of the key exchange. In each step there are several
sources of information. The input vectors xi(t) determine, in which directions
the weights are moved, if the learning rule is applied. And, together with the
outputs τA(t) and τB(t), they form an example, which gives some information
about the current weight vectors in A’s and B’s Tree Parity Machines. Although
all participants have access to xi(t), τ
A(t), and τB(t), the increase of the mutual
information I depends on the algorithm used to adjust the weights.
This is clearly visible in figure 4.11. While the partners reach full synchro-
nization with IAB = S0 quickly, the attacker is much slower. And E performs
better if she uses the geometric method instead of the simple attack. Of course,
these observations correspond to those presented in chapter 3.
While the differences between E’s attack methods are caused by the learning
algorithms, which transform the available information into more or less knowledge
about A’s and B’s weights, this is not the only reason for IAE(t) < IAB(t). In
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order to synchronize the partners have to agree on some weight vectors wi, which
are, in fact, functions of the sequence xi(t) and the initial conditions w
A/B
i (0).
So they already have some information, which they share during the process of
synchronization. Therefore the partners gain more mutual information I from
each message than an attacker, who has no prior knowledge about the outcome
of the key exchange. Consequently, it is the bidirectional interaction which gives
A and B an advantage over E.
4.3 Number of keys
Although all attacks on the neural key-exchange protocol known up to now are
based on the training of Tree Parity Machines with examples generated by the
partners A and B, this is not a necessary condition. Instead of that the oppo-
nent could try a brute-force attack. Of course, a success of this method is nearly
impossible without additional information, as there are (2L+1)KN different con-
figurations for the weights of a Tree Parity Machine. However, E could use some
clever algorithm to determine which keys are generated with high probability for
a given input sequence. Trying out these would be a feasible task as long as there
are not too many. Consequently, a large number of keys is important for the
security of neural cryptography, especially against brute-force attacks.
4.3.1 Synchronization without interaction
If the weights are chosen randomly, there are (2L+1)2KN possible configurations
for a pair of Tree Parity Machines. But the neural key-exchange protocol can
generate at most (2L+1)KN different keys. Consequently, sets of different initial
conditions exist, which lead to identical results. That is why synchronization
even occurs without any interaction between neural networks besides a common
sequence of input vectors.
In order to analyze this effect the following system consisting of two pairs of
Tree Parity Machines is used:
wA+i = g(w
A
i + f(σ
A
i , τ
A, τB)xi) , (4.18)
wB+i = g(w
B
i + f(σ
B
i , τ
A, τB)xi) , (4.19)
wC+i = g(w
C
i + f(σ
C
i , τ
C , τD)xi) , (4.20)
wD+i = g(w
D
i + f(σ
D
i , τ
C , τD)xi) . (4.21)
All four neural networks receive the same sequence of input vectors xi, but both
pairs communicate their output bits only internally. Thus A and B as well as
C and D synchronize using one of the available learning rules, while correlations
caused by common inputs are visible in the overlap ρACi . Because of the symmetry
in this system, ρADi , ρ
BC
i , and ρ
BD
i have the same properties as this quantity, so
that it is sufficient to look at ρACi only.
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Of course, synchronization of networks which do not interact with each other,
is much more difficult and takes a longer time than performing the normal key-
exchange protocol. Thus full internal synchronization of the pairs usually happens
well before A’s and C’s weight vectors become identical, so that ρABi = 1 and
ρCDi = 1 are assumed for the calculation of 〈∆ρACi (ρACi )〉.
As before, both attractive and repulsive steps are possible. In the case of
identical overlap between corresponding hidden units, random walk learning rule,
and K > 1, the probability of these step types is given by:
Pa =
1
2
(K−1)/2∑
i=0
(
K − 1
2i
)
(1− ǫ)K−2i ǫ2i
+
1
2
(K−1)/2∑
i=0
(
K − 1
2i
)
(1− ǫ)K−2i−1ǫ2i+1 , (4.22)
Pr =
K/2∑
i=1
(
K − 1
2i− 1
)
(1− ǫ)K−2iǫ2i
+
K/2∑
i=1
(
K − 1
2i− 1
)
(1− ǫ)K−2i+1 ǫ2i−1 . (4.23)
Here ǫ denotes the generalization error defined in equation (3.20) in regard to
ρAC . For K = 1 only attractive steps occur, so that Pa = 1, which is similar to
the geometric attack. But in the case of K = 3, one finds
Pa =
1
2
[1− 2(1− ǫ)ǫ] , (4.24)
Pr = 2(1− ǫ)ǫ . (4.25)
As long as ρAC > 0 the probability of repulsive steps is higher than PEr = ǫ for
the simple attack. Consequently, one expects that the dynamics of ρAC has a
fixed point at ρACf < ρ
E
f < 1 and synchronization is only possible by fluctuations.
Figure 4.12 shows that this is indeed the case. As more repulsive steps occur,
the probability for full synchronization here is much smaller than for a successful
simple attack. In fact, large enough fluctuations which lead from ρAC = 0 to
ρAC = 1 without interaction only occur in small systems. But the common input
sequence causes correlations between wAi and w
C
i even for L≫ 1 and N ≫ 1.
This is clearly visible in figure 4.13. However, if Hebbian or anti-Hebbian
learning is used instead of the random walk learning rule, one observes a some-
what different behavior: the fixed point of the dynamics for K = 3 is located
at ρf = 0. According to these two learning rules the weights of corresponding
hidden units move in opposite directions, if both τA 6= τC and σAi 6= σCi . The
average step size of such an inverse attractive step is given by
〈∆ρi(ρ)〉 = −〈∆ρa(−ρ)〉 . (4.26)
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Figure 4.12: Average change of the overlap between A and C for K = 3, L = 3,
and N = 1000, obtained in 100 simulations with 100 pairs of neural networks.
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Figure 4.13: Distribution of the overlap ρAC after 1000 steps for K = 3, L = 3,
and N = 100, obtained in 100 simulations with 100 pairs of Tree Parity Machines.
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While Pr is independent of the learning rule, one finds
Pa =
1
2
(K−1)/2∑
i=0
(
K − 1
2i
)
(1− ǫ)K−2i ǫ2i , (4.27)
Pi =
1
2
(K−1)/2∑
i=0
(
K − 1
2i
)
(1− ǫ)K−2i−1ǫ2i+1 (4.28)
for Hebbian or anti-Hebbian learning and K > 1. If K is odd, the effects
of all types of steps cancel out exactly at ρ = 0, because 〈∆ρr(0)〉 = 0 and
Pi(0) = Pa(0). Otherwise, the two transition probabilities, Pa(0) for attractive
steps and Pi(0) for inverse attractive steps, are only approximately equal. Thus
one observes ρf ≈ 0 independent of K, so that the correlations between A and C
are smaller in this case than for the random walk learning rule.
But if the initial overlap between A and C is already large, it is very likely
that both pairs of Tree Parity Machines generate the same key regardless of the
learning rule. Consequently, the number of keys nkey is smaller than the number
of weight configurations nconf = (2L+ 1)
KN of a Tree Parity Machine.
4.3.2 Effective key length
In order to further analyze the correlations between A’s and C’s neural networks
the entropy
SAC =
K∑
i=1
SACi (4.29)
of their weight distribution is used. Here SACi is the entropy of a single hidden
unit defined in (2.15). Of course, one can assume here that the weights stay
uniformly distributed during the process of synchronization, either because the
system size is large (N ≫ 1) or the random walk learning rule is used. Therefore
the entropy of a single network is given by S0 = KN ln(2L+ 1).
Consequently, SAC − S0 is the part of the total entropy, which describes the
correlations caused by using a common input sequence. It is proportional to the
effective length of the generated cryptographic key,
lkey =
SAC − S0
ln 2
, (4.30)
which would be the average number of bits needed to represent it using both
an optimal encoding without redundancy and the input sequence as additional
knowledge. If the possible results of the neural key-exchange protocol are uni-
formly distributed, each one can be represented by a number consisting of lkey
bits. In this case
nkey = 2
lkey = eS
AC−S0 (4.31)
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Figure 4.14: Entropy per weight for A and C for K = 3, L = 3, and random walk
learning rule, obtained in 100 simulations with 100 pairs of neural networks.
describes exactly the number of keys which can be generated using different
initial weights for the same input sequence. Otherwise, the real number is larger,
because mainly configurations, which occur with high probability, are relevant for
the calculation of SAC . However, an attacker is only interested in those prevalent
keys. Therefore nkey as defined in equation (4.31) is, in fact, a lower bound for
the number of cryptographic relevant configurations.
Figure 4.14 shows the time evolution of the entropy. First SAC shrinks linearly
with increasing t, as the overlap ρ between A and C grows, while it approaches
the stationary state. This behavior is consistent with an exponentially decreasing
number of keys, which can be directly observed in very small systems as shown in
figure 4.15. Of course, after the system has reached the fixed point, the entropy
stays constant. This minimum value of the entropy is then used to determine the
effective number nkey of keys according to (4.31).
It is clearly visible that there are two scaling relations for SAC :
• Entropy is an extensive quantity. Thus both SAC and S0 are proportional to
the number of weights N . Consequently, the number of keys, which can be
generated by the neural key-exchange protocol for a given input sequence,
grows exponentially with increasing system size N .
• The relevant time scale for all processes related to the synchronization of
Tree Parity Machines is defined by the step sizes of attractive and repulsive
steps which are asymptotically proportional to L−2. Therefore the time
needed to reach the fixed point ρACf is proportional to L
2, similar to 〈tsync〉.
In fact, it is even of the same order as the average synchronization time.
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Figure 4.15: Number of keys for K = 3, L = 1, N = 2, and random walk
learning rule, obtained by exhaustive search and averaged over 100 random input
sequences.
Instead of using the entropy directly, it is better to look at the mutual infor-
mation IAC = 2S0 − SAC shared by A and C, which comes from the common
input sequence and is visible in the correlations of the weight vectors. Using
(2.19) and (4.31) leads to [31]
IAC = − ln
(
nkey
nconf
)
. (4.32)
Therefore the effective number of keys is given by
nkey = nconf e
−IAC = (2L+ 1)KNe−I
AC
. (4.33)
As shown in figure 4.16 the mutual information IAC at the end of the synchro-
nization process becomes asymptotically independent of the synaptic depth in the
limit L→∞. Consequently, the ratio nkey/nconf is constant except for finite-size
effects occurring in small systems.
The amount of correlations between A and C depends on the distribution of
the overlap ρAC in the steady state, which can be described by its average value
ρf and its standard deviation σf . As before, σf decreases proportional to L
−1 due
to diminishing fluctuations in the limit L → ∞, while ρf stays nearly constant.
Hence IAC consists of two parts, one independent of L and one proportional to
L−1 as shown in figure 4.17.
In the case of the random walk learning rule the mutual information increases
with L, because fluctuations are reduced which just disturb the correlations cre-
ated by the common sequence of input vectors. Extrapolating IAC yields the
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Figure 4.16: Mutual information between A and C for K = 3, N = 1000, and
random walk learning rule, obtained in 1000 simulations with 10 pairs of neural
networks.
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Figure 4.17: Extrapolation of IAC for K = 3, L → ∞, and N = 1000. Symbols
denote the average value of IAC(t) in the range 80L2 ≤ t ≤ 100L2, which has
been obtained in 1000 simulations with 10 pairs of neural networks.
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result [31]
nkey ≈
[
0.66(2L+ 1)3
]N
, (4.34)
which is valid for K = 3 and 1≪ L≪ √N . Consequently, nkey grows exponen-
tially with N , so that there are always enough possible keys in larger systems to
prevent successful brute-force attacks on the neural key-exchange protocol.
Using Hebbian or anti-Hebbian learning, however, improves the situation fur-
ther. Because of ρf = 0 one finds nkey → nconf in the limit L → ∞. Therefore
the input sequence does not restrict the set of possible keys in very large systems
using K = 3, 1≪ L≪√N , and one of these two learning rules.
4.4 Secret inputs
The results of section 4.3 indicate that the input vectors are an important source
of information for the attacker. Thus keeping xi at least partially secret should
improve the security of the neural key-exchange protocol.
4.4.1 Feedback mechanism
In order to reduce the amount of input vectors transmitted over the public chan-
nel, the partners have to use an alternative source for the input bits. For that
purpose they can modify the structure of the Tree Parity Machines, which is
shown in figure 4.18 [19].
σ
w
x
τ
Π
Figure 4.18: A Tree Parity Machine with K = 3, N = 3, and feedback.
Here the generation of the input values is different. Of course, A and B still
start with a set of K randomly chosen public inputs xi. But in the following time
steps each input vector is shifted,
x
A/B+
i,j = x
A/B
i,j−1 for j > 1, (4.35)
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Figure 4.19: Probability of synchronization for two Tree Parity Machines with
feedback as a function of the initial overlap ρstart. Symbols denote results obtained
in 1000 simulations with K = 3, L = 3, and N = 100.
and the output bit σi of the corresponding hidden unit is used as the new first
component,
x
A/B+
i,1 = σ
A/B
i . (4.36)
This feedback mechanism [38] replaces the public sequence of random input vec-
tors. Additionally, the anti-Hebbian learning rule (2.7) is used to update the
weights. By doing so one avoids the generation of trivial keys, which would be
the result of the other learning rules [19]. Thus the hidden units of both Tree
Parity Machines work as confused bit generators [39].
However, synchronization is not possible without further information, as the
bit sequence produced by such a neural network is unpredictable [38, 40, 41] for
another one of the same type [19, 39]. This is clearly visible in figure 4.19. The
reason is that the input vectors of A’s and B’s Tree Parity Machines become more
and more different, because each occurrence of σAi 6= σBi reduces the number of
identical input bits by one for the next N steps. Of course, the partners disagree
on the outputs σi quite often at the beginning of the synchronization process, so
that they soon have completely uncorrelated input vectors and mutual learning
is no longer possible.
4.4.2 Synchronization with feedback
As the feedback mechanism destroys the common information about the inputs
of the Tree Parity Machines, an additional mechanism is necessary for synchro-
nization, which compensates this detrimental effect sufficiently. For that purpose
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Figure 4.20: Average synchronization time and its standard deviation for neural
cryptography with feedback, obtained in 10 000 simulations with K = 3 and
N = 10 000.
A and B occasionally reset the input vectors of their Tree Parity Machines if too
many steps with τA 6= τB occur.
In fact, the following algorithm is used [19]:
• If τA = τB, the weights are updated according to the anti-Hebbian learning
rule (2.7) and the feedback mechanism is used to generate the next input.
• If the output bits disagree, τA 6= τB, the input vectors are shifted, too, but
all pairs of input bits x
A/B
i,1 are set to common public random values.
• After R steps with different output, τA 6= τB, all inputs are reinitialized
using a set of K randomly chosen public input vectors.
Of course, setting R = 0 leads to synchronization without feedback, while no
synchronization is possible in the limit R→∞.
Figure 4.20 shows that using the feedback mechanism increases the average
number of steps needed to achieve full synchronization. While there are strong
finite size-effects, the scaling relation 〈tsync〉 ∝ L2 is still valid for 1≪ L≪
√
N .
Only the constant of proportionality is larger than before [19].
As shown in figure 4.21 a similar result can be observed in regard to the
success probability of the geometric attack. As before, PE drops exponentially
with increasing synaptic depth, so that A and B can achieve any desired level
of security by changing L. But with feedback smaller values of L are sufficient,
because the factors y1 and y2 in the scaling law (4.7) are larger. Therefore using
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synaptic depth L. Symbols denote results averaged over 10 000 simulations for
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the feedback mechanism improves the security of neural cryptography by keeping
input values partially secret.
However, A and B usually want to keep their effort constant. Then one has to
look at the function PE(〈tsync〉) instead of PE(L), which is plotted in figure 4.22
for several values of the feedback parameter R. It is clearly visible that PE(〈tsync〉)
does not depend much on R. Consequently, using feedback only yields a small
improvement of security unless the partners accept an increase of the average
synchronization time [19].
4.4.3 Key exchange with authentication
Synchronization of Tree Parity Machines by mutual learning only works if they
receive a common sequence of input vectors. This effect can be used to implement
an authentication mechanism for the neural key-exchange protocol [42, 43].
For that purpose each partner uses a separate, but identical pseudo-random
number generator. As these devices are initialized with a secret seed state shared
by A and B, they produce exactly the same sequence of bits, which is then used
to generate the input vectors xi needed during the synchronization process. By
doing so A and B can synchronize their neural networks without transmitting
input values over the public channel.
Of course, an attacker does not know the secret seed state. Therefore E
is unable to synchronize due to the lack of information about the input vectors.
Even an active man-in-the-middle attack does not help in this situation, although
it is always successful for public inputs.
Consequently, reaching full synchronization proves that both participants
know the secret seed state. Thus A and B can authenticate each other by per-
forming this variant of the neural key exchange. As one cannot derive the secret
from the public output bits, it is a zero-knowledge protocol [42].
Chapter 5
Key exchange with queries
The process of neural synchronization is driven by the sequence of input vectors,
which are really used to adjust the weights of the Tree Parity Machines according
to the learning rule. As these are selected by the partners participating in the
key exchange, A and B have an important advantage over E, who can only listen
to their communication. Up to now the partners just avoid repulsive steps by
skipping some of the randomly generated input vectors.
However, they can use their advantage in a better way. For this purpose the
random inputs are replaced by queries [44], which A and B choose alternately ac-
cording to their own weight vectors. In fact, the partners ask each other questions
and learn only the answers, on which they reach an agreement.
Of course, the properties of the synchronization process now depend not only
on the synaptic depth L of the Tree Parity Machines, but also on the chosen
queries. Thus there is an additional parameter H , which fixes the absolute value
|hi| of the local fields in the neural network generating the current query. As
the prediction error of a hidden unit is a function of both the overlap ρi and
the local field hi, the partners modify the probability of repulsive steps Pr(ρ) if
they change H . By doing so A and B are able to adjust the difficulty of neural
synchronization and learning [23].
In order to achieve a secure key exchange with queries the partners have to
choose the parameter H in such a way that they synchronize quickly, while an
attacker is not successful. Fortunately, this is possible for all known attacks [22].
Then one finds the same scaling laws again, which have been observed in the
case of synchronization with random inputs. But because of the new parameter
H one can reach a higher level of security for the neural key-exchange protocol
without increasing the average synchronization time [22, 23].
However, queries make additional information available to the attacker, as E
now knows the absolute value of the local fields in either A’s or B’s hidden units.
In principle, this information might be used in specially adapted methods. But
knowing H does not help E in the case of the geometric attack and its variants,
so that using queries does not introduce obvious security risks.
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5.1 Queries
In the neural key-exchange protocol as proposed in [13] the input vectors xi are
generated randomly and independent of the current weight vectors w
A/B
i of A’s
and B’s Tree Parity Machines. Of course, by interacting with each other the
partners are able to select which inputs they want to use for the movements of
the weights. But they use their influence on the process of synchronization only
for skipping steps with τA 6= τB in order to avoid repulsive effects. Although
this algorithm for choosing the relevant inputs is sufficient to achieve a more
or less secure key-exchange protocol, A and B could improve it by taking more
information into account.
In contrast, E uses the local field hEi of the hidden units in her Tree Parity
Machines in order to correct their output bits σEi if necessary. While this algo-
rithm, which is part of all known attack methods except the simple attack, is not
suitable for A and B, they could still use the information contained in h
A/B
i . Then
the probability for σAi 6= σBi or σEi 6= σA/Bi is no longer given by the generalization
error (3.20), but by the prediction error (3.30) of the perceptron [30].
Consequently, the partners are able to distinguish input vectors xi which are
likely to cause either attractive or repulsive steps if they look at the local field.
In fact, A’s and B’s situation is quite similar to E’s in the case of the geometric
attack. A low value of |hA/Bi | indicates a high probability for σAi 6= σBi . These
input vectors may slow down the process of synchronization due to repulsive
effects, so that it is reasonable to omit them. And a high value of |hA/Bi | indicates
that σEi = σ
A/B
i is very likely, which would help E. Therefore A and B could try
to select only input vectors xi with |hi| ≈ H for the application of the learning
rule, whereas the parameter H has to be chosen carefully in order to improve the
security of the neural key-exchange protocol.
While it is indeed possible to use the random sequence of input vectors and
just skip unsuitable ones with |hi| 6≈ H , this approach does not work well. If
the range of acceptable local fields is small, then a lot of steps do not change the
weights and 〈tsync〉 increases. But otherwise only small effects can be observed,
because most input vectors with τA = τB are accepted as before.
That is why the random inputs are replaced by queries [44], so that the
partners ask each other questions, which depend on their own weight vectors
w
A/B
i . In odd (even) steps A (B) generates K input vectors xi with h
A
i ≈ ±H
(hBi ≈ ±H) using the algorithm presented in appendix C. By doing so it is not
necessary to skip steps in order to achieve the desired result: the absolute value
of the local field hi is approximately given by the parameter H , while its sign σi
is chosen randomly [23].
As shown in figure 5.1 using queries affects the probability that two corre-
sponding hidden units disagree on their output σi. Compared to the case of
a random input sequence, this event occurs more frequently for small overlap,
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Figure 5.1: Probability of disagreeing hidden units in the case of queries with
different parameter H and Q = 1. The thick line shows P (σAi 6= σBi ) for random
inputs.
but less for nearly synchronized neural networks. Hence queries are especially
a problem for the attacker. As learning is slower than synchronization, ρAEi is
typically smaller than ρABi . In this situation queries increase the probability of
repulsive steps for the attacker, while the partners are able to regulate this effect
by choosing H in a way that it does not interfere much with their process of
synchronization. Consequently, using queries gives A and B more control over
the difficulty of both synchronization and learning.
5.2 Synchronization time
Because queries change the relation between the overlap ρABi and the probability
of repulsive steps PBr (ρ
AB
i ), using them affects the number of steps needed to
reach full synchronization. But the neural key-exchange protocol is only useful
in practice, if the synchronization time tsync is not too large. Otherwise, there
is no advantage compared to classical algorithms based on number theory. This
condition, of course, restricts the usable range of the new parameter H .
As shown in 5.2, 〈tsync〉 diverges for H → 0. In this limit the prediction error
ǫp reaches 1/2 independent of the overlap, so that the effect of the repulsive steps
inhibits synchronization. But as long as H is chosen large enough, it does not
have much influence on the effort of generating a key [23].
In fact, A and B can switch the mechanism of synchronization by modifying
H . This is clearly visible in figure 5.3. If the absolute value of the local fields
is so large that 〈∆ρ〉 > 0 for all ρ < 1, synchronization on average happens,
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Figure 5.2: Synchronization time of two Tree Parity Machines with K = 3,
N = 1000, and random walk learning rule, averaged over 10 000 simulations.
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Figure 5.3: Average change of the overlap for synchronization with queries using
K = 3, L = 5, N = 1000, and the random walk learning rule. Symbols denote
results obtained in 10 000 simulations, while the line shows 〈∆ρ〉 for synchroniza-
tion with random inputs.
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which is similar to the normal key-exchange protocol using a random sequence
of input vectors. But decreasing H below a certain value Hf creates a new fixed
point of the dynamics at ρf < 1. In this case synchronization is only possible
by fluctuations. As the gap with 〈∆ρ〉 < 0 grows with decreasing H < Hf , one
observes a steep increase of the average synchronization time 〈tsync〉. If A and B
use the random walk learning rule together with K = 3, L = 5, and N = 1000,
one finds Hf ≈ 1.76 in this case.
Additionally, figure 5.2 shows a dependency on the synaptic depth L of 〈tsync〉,
which is caused by two effects [23]:
• The speed of synchronization is proportional to the step sizes 〈∆ρa〉 for
attractive and 〈∆ρr〉 for repulsive steps. As shown in section 3.1.2, these
quantities decrease proportional to L−2. Therefore the average synchro-
nization time increases proportional to the square of the synaptic depth as
long as H > Hf :
〈tsync〉 ∝ L2 . (5.1)
This causes the vertical shift of the curves in figure 5.2.
• If queries are used, the probabilities Pa for attractive and Pr for repulsive
steps depend not only on the overlap ρi, but also on quantity H/
√
Qi ac-
cording to (3.30). In the case of the random walk learning rule the weights
stay uniformly distributed, so that the length of the weight vectors grows
proportional to L as shown in section 3.1.1. That is why one has to increase
H proportional to the synaptic depth,
H = αL , (5.2)
in order to achieve identical transition probabilities and consequently the
same average synchronization time. This explains the horizontal shift of
the curves in figure 5.2.
Using both scaling laws (5.1) and (5.2) one can rescale 〈tsync〉 in order to obtain
functions fL(α) which are nearly independent of the synaptic depth except for
finite-size effects [23]:
〈tsync〉 = L2fL
(
H
L
)
. (5.3)
Figure 5.4 shows these functions for different values of L. It is clearly visible
that fL(α) converges to a universal scaling function f(α) in the limit L→∞:
f(α) = lim
L→∞
fL(α) . (5.4)
Additionally, the finite-size effects have a similar behavior in regard to L as the
fluctuations of the overlap ρi, which have been analyzed in section 3.4.2. That
is why the distance |fL(α) − f(α)| shrinks proportional to L−1. Therefore the
86 5. Key exchange with queries
0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45
H / L
0
100
200
300
400
500
t sy
nc
 
/ L
2
L =   6
L =   7
L =   8
L =   9
L = 10
L → ∞
1087 6 5 4 3 2
L
0
20
40
60
80
100
t sy
nc
 
/ L
2
α = 0.35
α = 0.40
t sy
nc
 
/ L
2
25.9 + 96.0 / L
23.6 + 39.2 / L
Figure 5.4: Scaling behavior of the synchronization time. The thick curve denotes
the universal function f(α) defined in (5.4). It has been obtained by finite-size
scaling, which is shown in the inset.
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Figure 5.6: Synchronization time for neural cryptography with queries. These
results have been obtained in 100 simulations with K = 3 and L = 7.
universal function f(α) can be determined by finite-size scaling, which is shown
in figure 5.4, too.
This function diverges for α < αc. The critical value αc = Hc/L can be
estimated by extrapolating the inverse function f−1L , which is shown in 5.5. By
doing so one finds αc ≈ 0.31 for K = 3 and N = 1000, if A and B use the
random walk learning rule [22]. Consequently, synchronization is only achievable
for H > αcL in the limit L → ∞. However, in the case of finite synaptic depth
synchronization is even possible slightly below Hc due to fluctuations [23].
Although the weights do not stay uniformly distributed in the case of Hebbian
and anti-Hebbian learning, one observes qualitatively the same behavior of 〈tsync〉
as a function of the parameters H and L. This is clearly visible in figure 5.6. As
the length of the weight vectors is changed by these learning rules, the critical
local field Hc = αcL for synchronization is different. In the case of K = 3 and
N = 1000, one finds αc ≈ 0.36 for Hebbian learning [23] and αc ≈ 0.25 for anti-
Hebbian learning. But in the limit N → ∞ the behavior of both learning rules
converges to that of the random walk learning rule [22], which is also visible in
figure 5.6.
5.3 Security against known attacks
Because of the cryptographic application of neural synchronization it is important
that the key-exchange protocol using queries is not only efficient, but also secure
against the attacks known up to now. Therefore it is necessary to determine how
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Figure 5.7: Average change of the overlap forK = 3, L = 5, N = 1000, H = 1.77,
and M = 100. Symbols denote results obtained in 200 simulations using the
random walk learning rule.
different absolute values of the local field influence the security of the system.
Of course, the results impose further restrictions upon the usable range of the
parameter H .
5.3.1 Dynamics of the overlap
Replacing random inputs with queries gives A and B an additional advantage
over E. Now they can choose a suitable value of the new parameter H , which
influences the probability of repulsive steps as shown in figure 5.1 (on page 83).
By doing so the partners are able to modify the dynamics of the synchronization
process, not only for themselves, but also for an attacker. And because 〈∆ρAB(ρ)〉
is greater than 〈∆ρAE(ρ)〉, A and B can generate queries in such a way that a
fixed point of the dynamics at ρf < 1 only exists for E. Then the neural key-
exchange protocol is secure in principle, because 〈tEsync〉 grows exponentially with
increasing synaptic depth while 〈tBsync〉 ∝ L2.
Figure 5.7 shows that this is indeed possible. Here A and B have chosen
H ≈ Hf , so that they just synchronize on average. In contrast, E can reach the
absorbing state at ρ = 1 only by fluctuations, as there is a fixed point of the
dynamics at ρf < 1 for both the geometric attack and the majority attack. In
principle, this situation is similar to that observed in the case of random inputs.
However, the gap between the fixed point and the absorbing state is larger, so
that the success probability of both attacks is decreased. This is clearly visible
by comparing figure 5.3 with figure 3.16 (on page 44) and figure 4.7 (on page 64).
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Figure 5.8: Success probability PE as a function of H . Symbols denote the results
obtained in 1000 simulations using K = 3, L = 10, N = 1000, and the random
walk learning rule, while the lines show fit results for model (5.5). The number
of attacking networks is M = 4096 for the genetic attack and M = 100 for the
majority attack.
5.3.2 Success probability
In practice it is necessary to look at the success probability PE of the known
attacks in order to determine the level of security provided by neural cryptography
with queries.
As shown in figure 5.8, E is nearly always successful in the case of large H ,
because she is able to synchronize on average similar to A and B. But if H is
small, the attacker can reach full synchronization only by fluctuations, so that
PE drops to zero. In fact, one can use a Fermi-Dirac distribution
PE =
1
1 + exp(−β(H − µ)) (5.5)
as a suitable fitting function in order to describe PE as a function of H . This
model is suitable for both the majority attack [23] and the genetic attack [22].
Of course, one can also use it to describe PE(H) of the geometric attack, which
is the special case M = 1 of the more advanced attacks. Comparing these curves
in figure 5.8 reveals directly that the genetic attack is the best choice for the
attacker in this case.
Additionally, one observes a similar behavior for all three learning rules. This
is clearly visible in figure 5.9. Only the fit parameters are different due to the
changed length of the weight vectors. Hebbian learning increases Qi, so that an
higher value of H is needed in order to achieve the same value of the success
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Figure 5.9: Success probability PE of the majority attack for K = 3, L = 10,
N = 1000, and M = 100. Symbols denote results obtained in 10 000 simulations,
while lines represents fits with model (5.5).
probability. In contrast, the anti-Hebbian learning rule decreases Qi, so that one
observes a similar behavior with a lower value of H . Consequently, equation (5.5)
is a universal model, which describes the success probability PE as a function of
the absolute local field H for all known attacks.
However, it is not sufficient to know the fit parameters µ and β for only one
value of the synaptic depth. In order to estimate the security of the neural key-
exchange protocol with queries, one has to look at the scaling behavior of these
quantities in regard to L.
Figure 5.10 shows that increasing the synaptic depth does not change the
shape of PE(H) much, so that the steepness β is nearly constant for L > 3. But
there is a horizontal shift of the curves due to the growing length of the weight
vectors. In fact, the position µ of the smooth step increases linearly with the
synaptic depth L,
µ = αsL+ δ , (5.6)
which is shown in figure 5.11. As before, the method chosen by E does not matter,
because equation (5.6) is valid in all cases [22, 23]. Only the parameters αs and δ
depend on the learning rule and the attack. This is clearly visible in figure 5.12
and in figure 5.13.
Combining (5.5) and (5.6) yields
PE =
1
1 + exp(β δ) exp(β (αs − α)L) (5.7)
for the success probability of any known attack. As long as A and B choose
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Figure 5.10: Success probability of the geometric attack for K = 3, N = 1000,
and the Hebbian learning rule. Symbols denote results obtained in 10 000 simu-
lations, while lines show fits with model (5.5).
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Figure 5.11: Parameters µ and β as a function of the synaptic depth L for the
geometric attack. Symbols denote the results of fits using model (5.5), based on
10 000 simulations with K = 3 and N = 1000.
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Figure 5.12: Parameter µ and β as a function of L for the genetic attack with
K = 3, N = 1000, and M = 4096. The symbols represent results from 1000
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Figure 5.13: Parameters µ and β as a function of the synaptic depth L for the
majority attack. Symbols denote the results of fits using model (5.5), based on
10 000 simulations with K = 3, N = 1000, and M = 100.
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α = H/L according to the condition α < αs, PE vanishes for L → ∞. In this
case its asymptotic behavior is given by
PE ∼ e−β δ e−β (αs−α)L , (5.8)
which is consistent with the observation
PE ∼ e−y(L−L0) (5.9)
found for neural cryptography with random inputs [16]. Comparing the coeffi-
cients in both equations reveals
y = β (αs − α) , (5.10)
L0 = −δ/(αs − α) . (5.11)
Thus replacing random inputs with queries gives A and B direct influence on the
scaling of PE in regard to L, as they can change y by modifying α. Finally, the
results indicate that there are two conditions for a fast and secure key-exchange
protocol based on neural synchronization with queries:
• As shown in section 5.2 the average synchronization time 〈tsync〉 diverges in
the limit L→∞, if H is too small. Therefore A and B have to choose this
parameter according to H > αcL.
• And if H is too large, the key-exchange becomes insecure, because PE = 1
is reached in the limit L→∞. So the partners have to fulfill the condition
H < αsL for all known attacks.
Fortunately, A and B can always choose a fixed α = H/L according to
αc < α < αs , (5.12)
as there is no known attack with αs ≤ αc. Then 〈tsync〉 grows proportional to
L2, but PE drops exponentially with increasing synaptic depth. Consequently, A
and B can reach any desired level of security by just changing L [22].
5.3.3 Optimal local field
For practical aspects of security, however, it is important to look at the relation
between the average synchronization time and the success probability, as a too
complex key-exchange protocol is nearly as unusable as an insecure one. That
is why A and B want to minimize PE for a given value of 〈tsync〉 by choosing L
and H appropriately. These optimum values can be determined by analyzing the
function PE(〈tsync〉).
Figure 5.14 shows the result for the geometric attack. The optimum value of
H lies on the envelope of all functions PE(〈tsync〉). This curve is approximately
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Figure 5.14: Success probability of the geometric attack as a function of 〈tsync〉.
Symbols denote results obtained in 10 000 simulations using the Hebbian learning
rule, K = 3, and N = 1000. The solid curve represents PE in the case of random
inputs and the dashed line marks H = 0.36L.
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Figure 5.15: Success probability of the majority attack as a function of 〈tsync〉.
Symbols denote results obtained in 10 000 simulations using the Hebbian learning
rule, K = 3, M = 100, and N = 1000. The solid curve represents PE in the case
of random inputs and the dashed line marks H = 0.36L.
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Figure 5.16: Success probability of the genetic attack as a function of 〈tsync〉. Sym-
bols denote results obtained in 1000 simulations using the random walk learning
rule, K = 3, M = 4096, and N = 1000. The solid curve represents PE in the
case of random inputs and the dashed line marks H = 0.32L.
given by H = αcL, as this choice maximizes αs−α, while synchronization is still
possible [23]. It is also clearly visible that queries improve the security of the
neural key-exchange protocol greatly for a given average synchronization time.
A similar result is obtained for the majority attack. Here figure 5.15 shows
that the partners can even do better by using queries with H < αcL as long as L
is not too large. This effect is based on fluctuations which enable synchronization,
but vanish in the limit L → ∞. Thus the optimum value of H is still given by
H ≈ αcL if L ≫ 1. Additionally, figure 5.15 indicates that A and B can even
employ the Hebbian learning rule for neural cryptography with queries, which
led to an insecure key-exchange protocol in the case of random inputs [21, 23].
5.3.4 Genetic attack
Compared to the other methods the genetic attack is in a certain way different.
First, it is especially successful, if L is small. That is why A and B have to use
Tree Parity Machines with large synaptic depth L regardless of the parameter
H . Of course, this sets a lower limit for the effort of performing the neural
key-exchange protocol as shown in figure 5.16.
Second, the genetic attack is a rather complicated algorithm with a lot of
parameters. Of course, E tries to optimize them in order to adapt to special sit-
uations. Here the number M of attacking networks is clearly the most important
parameter, because it limits the number of mutation steps ts which can occur
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fitting simulation data with (5.5) and the lines were calculated using the model
given in (5.6).
between two selection steps:
ts ≤ 1
K − 1
lnM
ln 2
. (5.13)
Thus E can test different variants of the internal representation (σ1, . . . σK) for
at most ts steps, before she has to select the fittest Tree Parity Machines. And
more time results in better decisions eventually. Therefore one expects that E
can improve PE by increasing M similar to the effect observed for random inputs
in section 4.1.2.
Figure 5.17 shows that this is indeed the case. While αs stays constant, the
offset δ decreases with increasing M . As before, it is a logarithmic effect,
δ(M) = δ(1)− δE lnM , (5.14)
which is clearly visible in figure 5.18. Therefore E gains a certain horizontal shift
δE ln 2 of the smooth step function PE(H) by doubling the effort used for the
genetic attack [22]. Combining (4.9) and (5.7) yields
PE =
1
1 + exp(β(δ(1)− δE lnM)) exp(β(αs − α)L) (5.15)
for the success probability of this method. Then the asymptotic behavior for
L≫ 1 is given by
PE ∼ e−β(δ(1)−δE lnM)e−β(αs−α)L (5.16)
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Figure 5.18: Offset δ as a function of the number of attackers M , for the genetic
attack with K = 3, N = 1000, and the random walk learning rule. Symbols and
the line were obtained by a fit with (5.14).
as long as α < αs. Similar to neural cryptography with random inputs E has to
increase the number of attacking networks exponentially,
M ∝ e[(αs−α)/δE ]L , (5.17)
in order to maintain a constant success probability PE, if A and B change the
synaptic depth L. But, due to limited computer power, this is often not feasible.
However, the attacker could also try to improve PE by changing the other
parameters U and V of the genetic attack. Instead of the default values U = 10,
V = 20 E could use U = 30, V = 50, which maximize PE without greatly
changing the complexity of the attack [22]. But this optimal choice, which is
clearly visible in figure 5.19, does not help much as shown in figure 5.17. Only β
is lower for the optimized attack, while αs remains nearly the same. Therefore the
attacker gains little, as the scaling relation (5.17) is not affected. Consequently,
the neural key-exchange protocol with queries is even secure against an optimized
variant of the genetic attack in the limit L→∞.
5.3.5 Comparison of the attacks
Of course, the opponent E always employs the best method, which is available to
her in regard to computing power and other resources. Therefore it is necessary
to compare all known attack methods in order to estimate the level of security
achieved by a certain set of parameters.
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Figure 5.19: Success probability of the genetic attack in the case of K = 3, L = 7,
N = 1000, M = 4096, H = 2.28, and random walk learning rule. These results
were obtained by averaging over 100 simulations.
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Figure 5.20: Success probability of different attacks as a function of the synaptic
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walk learning rule, K = 3, H = 0.32L, and N = 1000, while the lines show fit
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The result for neural cryptography with queries is shown in figure 5.20. It is
qualitatively similar to that observed in section 4.1.4 in the case of synchroniza-
tion with random inputs. As the majority attack has the minimum value of αs,
it is usually the best method for the attacker. Only if A and B use Tree Parity
Machines with small synaptic depth, the genetic attack is better.
However, comparing figure 5.20 with figure 4.9 (on page 65) reveals, that there
are quite large quantitative differences, as replacing random inputs with queries
greatly improves the security of the neural key-exchange protocol. Extrapolation
of (5.9) shows that PE ≈ 10−4 is achieved for K = 3, L = 18, N = 1000,
H = 5.76, and random walk learning rule. This is much easier to realize than
L = 57, which would be necessary in order to reach the same level of security in
the case of random inputs.
5.4 Possible security risks
Although using queries improves the security of the neural key-exchange proto-
col against known attacks, there is a risk that a clever attacker may improve the
success probability PE by using additional information revealed through the algo-
rithm generating the input vectors. Two obvious approaches are analyzed here.
First, E could use her knowledge about the absolute local field H to improve the
geometric correction of the internal representation (σE1 , . . . , σ
E
K). Second, each
input vector xi is somewhat correlated to the corresponding weight vector wi of
the generating network. This information could be used for a new attack method.
5.4.1 Known local field
If the partners use queries, the absolute value of the local field in either A’s or
B’s hidden units is given by H . And E knows the local fields hEi in her own Tree
Parity Machine. In this situation the probability of σEi 6= σAi is no longer given
by (3.20) or (3.30), if it is A’s turn to generate the input vectors. Instead, one
finds
P (σEi 6= σAi ) =
[
1 + exp
(
2ρAEi
1− (ρAEi )2
H√
QAi
|hEi |√
QEi
)]−1
. (5.18)
Although one might assume that this probability is minimal for |hEi | ≈ H , it is
not the case. In contrast, P (σEi 6= σAi ) reaches its maximum at |hEi | = 0 and is a
strictly decreasing function of |hEi | as before.
This is clearly visible in figure 5.21. As there is no qualitative difference
compared to synchronization with random inputs, it is not possible to improve
the geometric attack by using H as additional information. Instead, it is still
optimal for E to flip the output of that hidden unit, which has the minimum
absolute value of the local field.
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5.4.2 Information about weight vectors
WhileH cannot be used directly in the geometric attack, queries give E additional
information about the weight vectors in A’s and B’s Tree Parity Machines. But
fortunately the absolute local field H used for synchronization with queries is
lower than the average value
〈|hk|〉 =
√
2Qi/π ≈ 0.8
√
Qi (5.19)
observed for random inputs. Hence the overlap
ρi,in =
wi · xi√
wi ·wi√xi · xi =
1√
N
hi√
Qi
(5.20)
between input vector and weight vector is very small and converges to zero in the
limit N →∞, althoughH > 0. Consequently, xi andwi are nearly perpendicular
to each other, so that the information revealed by queries is minimized [23].
In fact, for a given value of H the number of weight vectors, which are con-
sistent with a given query, is still exponentially large. As an example, there are
2.8×10129 possible weight vectors for a query with H = 10, L = 10, and N = 100
[23]. Consequently, E cannot benefit from the information contained in the input
vectors generated by A and B.
Chapter 6
Conclusions and outlook
In this thesis the synchronization of neural networks by learning from each other
has been analyzed and discussed. At a glance this effect looks like an extension of
online learning to a series of examples generated by a time dependent rule. How-
ever, it turns out that neural synchronization is a more complicated dynamical
process, so that new phenomena occur.
This is especially true for Tree Parity Machines, whereas synchronization is
driven by stochastic attractive and repulsive forces. Because this process does
not have a self-averaging order parameter, one has to take the whole distribution
of the weights into account instead of using just the average value of the order
parameter to determine the dynamics of the system. This can be done using
direct simulations of the variables wi,j for finite N or a iterative calculation of
their probability distribution in the limit N →∞.
While one can use different learning rules both for bidirectional synchroniza-
tion and unidirectional learning, they show similar behavior and converge to the
random walk learning rule in the limit N → ∞. So the deviations caused by
Hebbian and anti-Hebbian learning are, in fact, finite-size effects, which become
only relevant for L≫ O(√N).
In contrast, numerical simulations as well as iterative calculations show a
phenomenon, which is significant even in very large systems: In the case of Tree
Parity Machines learning by listening is much slower than mutual synchroniza-
tion. This effect is caused by different possibilities of interaction. Two neural
networks, which can influence each other, are able to omit steps, if they caused a
repulsive effect. This is an advantage compared to a third Tree Parity Machine,
which is trained using the examples produced by the other two and cannot select
the most suitable input vectors for learning. Consequently, if interaction is only
possible in one direction, the frequency of repulsive steps is higher than in the
case of bidirectional communication.
Although the overlap ρ is not a self-averaging quantity, one can describe neural
synchronization as a random walk in ρ-space. Here the average step sizes 〈∆ρa〉
and 〈∆ρr〉 are the same for synchronization and learning. But the transition
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probabilities Pa(ρ) and Pr(ρ) depend on the type of interaction. As a result one
can observe qualitative differences regarding the dynamics of the overlap. In the
case of K = 3 and bidirectional interaction the average change of the overlap
〈∆ρ〉 is strictly positive, so that synchronization by mutual learning happens on
average. But for K > 3 or unidirectional interaction the higher probability of
repulsive steps causes a fixed point of the dynamics at ρf < 1. Then reaching the
absorbing state at ρ = 1 is only possible by means of fluctuations.
While both mechanisms lead to full synchronization eventually, one observes
two different distributions of the synchronization time depending on the function
〈∆ρ(ρ)〉. In the case of synchronization on average, it is a Gumbel distribution,
because one has to wait until the last weight has synchronized. Analytical calcu-
lations for systems without repulsive steps yield the result 〈tsync〉 ∝ L2 lnN . And
a few repulsive steps do not change this scaling behavior, but simply increase the
constant of proportionality.
In contrast, if synchronization is only possible by means of fluctuations, there
is a constant probability per step to get over the gap with 〈∆ρ(ρ)〉 < 0 between
the fixed point and the absorbing state. Of course, this yields an exponential
distribution of the synchronization time. However, the fluctuations of the overlap
in the steady state decrease proportional to L−1. As they are essential for reaching
ρ = 1 in this case, the synchronization time grows exponentially with increasing
synaptic depth of the Tree Parity Machines.
Without this difference a secure key-exchange protocol based on the synchro-
nization of neural networks would be impossible. But as A’s and B’s Tree Parity
Machines indeed synchronize faster than E’s neural networks, the partners can
use the synchronized weight vectors as a secret session key. Of course, there is
a small probability PE that E is successful before A and B have finished their
key exchange due to the stochastic nature of the synchronization process. But
fortunately PE drops exponentially with increasing L for nearly all combinations
of learning rules and attack methods. Thus A and B can achieve any level of
security by just increasing the synaptic depth L.
Additionally, there are other observations which indicate that bidirectional
interaction is an advantage for A and B compared to a passive attacker E. For a
time series generated by two Tree Parity Machines the version space of compatible
initial conditions is larger, if both are already synchronized at the beginning, than
if the neural networks start unsynchronized. So it is harder for an attacker to
imitate B because of the interaction between the partners. And, of course, the
attack methods are unable to extract all the information which is necessary to
achieve full synchronization. This effect is mainly caused by the fact, that A and
B can choose the most useful input vectors from the random sequence, but E
does not have this ability [45].
Thus the partners can improve the security of neural cryptography further, if
they use a more advanced algorithm to select the input vectors. This approach
eventually leads to synchronization with queries. In this variant of the key-
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exchange protocol A and B ask each other questions, which depend on the weights
in their own networks. In doing so they are able to choose the absolute value of
the local field in the Tree Parity Machine generating the current query. Of course,
this affects both synchronization and attacks. However, E is at a disadvantage
compared to A and B, because she needs a higher absolute value of the local field
than the partners in order to synchronize on average. Therefore it is possible to
adjust the new parameter H in such a way, that A and B synchronize fast, but
E is not successful regardless of the attack method.
However, the algorithm generating the input vectors does not matter for the
opponent. E has no influence on it and the relative efficiency of the attacks stays
the same, whether a random input sequence or queries are used. In both cases
the majority attack is the best method as long as the synaptic depth is large.
Only if L is small, the genetic attack is better. Of course, both advanced attacks
are always more successful than the geometric attack. And the simple attack is
only useful for K ≫ 3.
In any case, the effort of the partners grows only polynomially, while the suc-
cess probability of an attack drops exponentially, if the synaptic depth increases.
Similar scaling laws can be found, if one looks at other cryptographic systems.
Only the parameter is different. While the security of conventional cryptography
[25, 26] depends on the length of the key, the synaptic depth of the Tree Parity
Machines plays the same role in the case of neural cryptography [22].
Brute-force attacks are not very successful, either. Here the number of keys
grows exponentially with the system size N , while the synchronization time is
only proportional to logN . Thus A and B can use large systems without much
additional effort in order to prevent successful guessing of the generated key.
Consequently, the neural key-exchange protocol is secure against all attacks
known up to now. However, there is always the risk that one might find a clever
attack, which breaks the security of neural cryptography completely, because it
is hardly ever possible to prove the security of such an algorithm [25].
However, the neural key-exchange protocol is different from conventional cryp-
tographic algorithms in one aspect. Here effects in a physical system, namely at-
tractive and repulsive stochastic forces, are used instead of those found in number
theory. In fact, the trap door function is realized by a dynamics, which is differ-
ent for partners and attackers based on their possibilities of interaction with the
other participants. Of course, neural networks are not the only type of systems
with these properties. Any other system showing similar effects can be used for
such a cryptographic application, too.
Interesting systems include chaotic maps and coupled lasers [46–49]. In both
cases one observes that synchronization is achieved faster for bidirectional than
for unidirectional coupling. As this underlying effect is very similar, one can use
nearly the same cryptographic protocol by just substituting the neural networks.
Of course, this applies to the attack methods, too. For example, the algorithms of
the majority attack and the genetic attack are so general, that they are also useful
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methods for attacks on key-exchange protocols using chaotic maps. In contrast,
the geometric correction algorithm is rather specific for neural networks, so that
it has to be replaced by appropriate methods.
Consequently, the neural key-exchange protocol is only the first element of
a class of new cryptographic algorithms. Of course, all these proposals have to
be analyzed in regard to efficiency and security. For that purpose the methods
used in this thesis can probably act as a guidance. Especially synchronization by
fluctuations and synchronization on average are rather abstract concepts, so that
one should be able to observe them in a lot of systems.
Another interesting direction is the implementation of the neural key-exchange
protocol. Computer scientists are already working on a hardware realization of
interacting Tree Parity Machines for cryptographic purposes [50–55]. They have
especially found out that neural synchronization only needs very basic mathe-
matical operations and, therefore, is very fast compared to algorithms based on
number theory. Consequently, one can use neural cryptography in small embed-
ded systems, which are unable to use RSA or other established methods [25, 26].
Here it does not matter that the neural key-exchange protocol only reaches a
moderate level of security as long as one requires a small synchronization time.
But integrated circuits can achieve a very high frequency of key updates, which
compensates this disadvantage [50–52].
Finally, these approaches indicate that further development of neural cryp-
tography is indeed possible. As mentioned before, there are, in fact, two distinct
directions: First, one can extend the neural key-exchange protocol in order to
improve the efficiency, security and usefulness for specific cryptographic applica-
tions, e. g. embedded systems. Second, one can replace the neural networks by
other physical systems, e. g. chaotic lasers, which have similar properties to those
identified in this thesis as essential for security.
Appendix A
Notation
A sender
B receiver
E attacker
K number of hidden units in a Tree Parity Machine
L synaptic depth of the neural networks
N number of neurons per hidden unit
M (maximum) number of attacking networks
H absolute set value of the local field
R threshold for the reset of the input vectors
U minimal fitness
V length of the output history
wi weight vector of the i-th hidden unit
xi input vector of the i-th hidden unit
wi,j j-th element of wi
xi,j j-th element of xi
σi output of the i-th hidden unit
τ total output of a Tree Parity Machine
hi local field of the i-th hidden unit
ρi overlap of the i-th hidden unit
ǫi generalization error
ǫpi prediction error
Pa probability of attractive steps
Pr probability of repulsive steps
∆ρa step size of an attractive step
∆ρr step size of a repulsive step
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〈∆ρ〉 average change of the overlap
ρf fixed point of the dynamics
σf width of the ρ-distribution at the fixed point
I mutual information
S entropy of a weight distribution
S0 maximal entropy of a single neural network
nconf number of possible weight configurations
nkey number of distinct keys
nvs size of the version space
T synchronization time for two random walks
TN synchronization time for N pairs of random walks
tsync synchronization time for two Tree Parity Machines
PE success probability of an attacker
y sensitivity of PE in regard to L
L0 minimal value of L for the exponential decay of PE
α rescaled local field H/L
αc minimum α for synchronization
αs maximum α for security
β sensitivity of PE in regard to H
δ offset of PE(H)
γ Euler-Mascheroni constant (γ ≈ 0.577)
Auxiliary functions for the learning rules
• control signal
f(σ, τA, τB) = Θ(στA)Θ(τAτB)


σ Hebbian learning rule
−σ anti-Hebbian learning rule
1 random walk learning rule
• boundary condition
g(w) =
{
sgn(w)L for |w| > L
w otherwise
Appendix B
Iterative calculation
This appendix presents the algorithm, which is used to calculate the time evolu-
tion of the weight distribution iteratively in the limit N →∞ [17–19]. Compared
to direct simulations N weights are replaced by (2L+1)× (2L+1) variables pia,b,
which describe the probability that one finds a weight with wAi,j = a and w
B
i,j = b.
Consequently, one has to adapt both the calculation of the output bits and the
update of the weight configuration.
B.1 Local field and output bits
According to its definition (2.3) the local field hi of a hidden unit is proportional
to the sum over N independent random variables wi,j xi,j. Therefore the central
limit theorem applies and the probability to find certain values of hAi and h
B
i in
a time step is given by
P (hAi , h
B
i ) =
e−(1/2)(h
A
i ,h
B
i )C
−1
i (h
A
i ,h
B
i )
T
2π
√
det Ci
. (B.1)
In this equation the covariance matrix C describes the correlations between A’s
and B’s Tree Parity Machines in terms of the well-known order parameters Q and
R, which are functions of the weight distribution according to (2.11), (2.12), and
(2.13):
Ck =
(
QAi R
AB
i
RABi Q
B
k
)
. (B.2)
In order to generate local fields hAi and h
B
i , which have the correct joint proba-
bility distribution (B.1), the following algorithm is used. A pseudo-random num-
ber generator produces two independent uniformly distributed random numbers
z1, z2 ∈ [0, 1[. Then the local fields are given by [56]
hAi =
√
−2QAi ln(z1) cos(2πz2) , (B.3)
hBi =
√
−2QBi ln(z1)
[
ρ cos(2πz2) +
√
1− ρ2 sin(2πz2)
]
. (B.4)
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Afterwards one can calculate the outputs σi and τ in the same way as in the case
of direct simulations. As the local fields are known, it is possible to implement
the geometric correction, too. Therefore this method is also suitable to study
synchronization by unidirectional learning, e. g. for a geometric attacker. Addi-
tionally, the algorithm can be extended to three and more interacting Tree Parity
Machines [19].
B.2 Equations of motion
The equations of motion are generally independent of the learning rule, because
the behavior of Hebbian and anti-Hebbian learning converges to that of the ran-
dom walk learning rule in the limit N → ∞. Consequently, the weights in both
participating Tree Parity Machines stay uniformly distributed, only the correla-
tions between wAi and w
B
i change.
Attractive steps
In an attractive step corresponding weights move in the same direction. Thus
the distribution of the weights changes according to the following equations of
motion for −L < a, b < L:
pi+a,b =
1
2
(
pia+1,b+1 + p
i
a−1,b−1
)
, (B.5)
pi+a,L =
1
2
(
pia−1,L + p
i
a−1,L−1
)
, (B.6)
pi+a,−L =
1
2
(
pia+1,−L + p
i
a+1,−L+1
)
, (B.7)
pi+L,b =
1
2
(
piL,b−1 + p
i
L−1,b−1
)
, (B.8)
pi+−L,b =
1
2
(
pi−L,b+1 + p
i
−L+1,b+1
)
, (B.9)
pi+L,L =
1
2
(
piL−1,L−1 + p
i
L−1,L + p
i
L,L−1 + p
i
L,L
)
, (B.10)
pi+−L,−L =
1
2
(
pi−L+1,−L+1 + p
i
−L+1,−L + p
i
−L,−L+1 + p
i
−L,−L
)
, (B.11)
pi+L,−L = 0 , (B.12)
pi+−L,L = 0 . (B.13)
Repulsive steps
In a repulsive step only the weights in one hidden unit move, either in A’s or in
B’s Tree Parity Machine. However, the active hidden unit is selected randomly
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by the output bits, so that both possibilities occur with equal probability. Thus
one can combine them in one set of equations for −L < a, b < L:
pi+a,b =
1
4
(
pia+1,b + p
i
a−1,b + p
i
a,b+1 + p
i
a,b−1
)
, (B.14)
pi+a,L =
1
4
(
pia+1,L + p
i
a−1,L + p
i
a,L + p
i
a,L−1
)
, (B.15)
pi+a,−L =
1
4
(
pia+1,−L + p
i
a−1,−L + p
i
a,−L+1 + p
i
a,−L
)
, (B.16)
pi+L,b =
1
4
(
piL,b + p
i
L−1,b + p
i
L,b+1 + p
i
L,b−1
)
, (B.17)
pi+−L,b =
1
4
(
pi−L+1,b + p
i
−L,b + p
i
−L,b+1 + p
i
−L,b−1
)
, (B.18)
pi+L,L =
1
4
(
2piL,L + p
i
L−1,L + p
i
L,L−1
)
, (B.19)
pi+−L,−L =
1
4
(
2pi−L,−L + p
i
−L+1,−L + p
i
−L,−L+1
)
, (B.20)
pi+L,−L =
1
4
(
2piL,−L + p
i
L−1,−L + p
i
L,−L+1
)
, (B.21)
pi+−L,L =
1
4
(
2pi−L,L + p
i
−L+1,L + p
i
−L,L−1
)
. (B.22)
Inverse attractive steps
Inverse attractive steps are only possible if A and B do not interact at all, but
use common input vectors. In such a step corresponding weights move in the
opposite direction. Thus the distribution of the weights changes according to the
following equations of motion for −L < a, b < L:
pi+a,b =
1
2
(
pia+1,b−1 + p
i
a−1,b+1
)
, (B.23)
pi+a,L =
1
2
(
pia+1,L + p
i
a+1,L−1
)
, (B.24)
pi+a,−L =
1
2
(
pia−1,−L + p
i
a−1,−L+1
)
, (B.25)
pi+L,b =
1
2
(
piL,b+1 + p
i
L−1,b+1
)
, (B.26)
pi+−L,b =
1
2
(
pi−L,b−1 + p
i
−L+1,b−1
)
, (B.27)
pi+L,L = 0 , (B.28)
pi+−L,−L = 0 , (B.29)
pi+L,−L =
1
2
(
piL−1,−L+1 + p
i
L−1,−L + p
i
L,−L+1 + p
i
L,−L
)
, (B.30)
pi+−L,L =
1
2
(
pi−L+1,L−1 + p
i
−L+1,L + p
i
−L,L−1 + p
i
−L,L
)
. (B.31)
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Appendix C
Generation of queries
This appendix describes the algorithm [23] used to generate a query xi, which
results in a previously chosen local field hi. Finding an exact solution is similar to
the knapsack problem [57] and can be very difficult depending on the parameters.
Hence this is not useful for simulations, as one has to generate a huge number of
input vectors xi in this case. Instead a fast algorithm is employed, which gives
an approximate solution.
As both inputs xi,j and weights wi,j are discrete, there are only 2L+1 possible
results for the product wi,j xi,j. Therefore a set of input vectors consisting of all
permutations, which do not change hi, can be described by counting the number
ci,l of products with wi,j xi,j = l. Then the local field is given by
hi =
1√
N
L∑
l=1
l(ci,l − ci,−l) , (C.1)
which depends on both inputs and weights. But the sum ni,l = ci,l + ci,−l is
equal to the number of weights with |wi,j| = |l| and thus independent of xi.
Consequently, one can write hi as a function of only L variables,
hi =
1√
N
L∑
l=1
l(2ci,l − ni,l) , (C.2)
as the values of ni,l are defined by the current weight vector wi.
In the simulations the following algorithm [23] is used to generate the queries.
First the output σi of the hidden unit is chosen randomly, so that the set value
of the local field is given by hi = σiH . Then the values of ci,L, ci,L−1, . . . , ci,1
are calculated successively. For that purpose one of the following equations is
selected randomly with equal probability, either
ci,l =
⌊
ni,l + 1
2
+
1
2l
(
σiH
√
N −
L∑
j=l+1
j(2ci,j − ni,j)
)⌋
(C.3)
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or
ci,l =
⌈
ni,l − 1
2
+
1
2l
(
σiH
√
N −
L∑
j=l+1
j(2ci,j − ni,j)
)⌉
, (C.4)
in order to reduce the influence of rounding errors. Additionally, one has to take
the condition 0 ≤ ci,l ≤ ni,l into account. If equation (C.3) or equation (C.4)
yield a result outside this range, ci,l is reset to the nearest boundary value.
Afterwards the input vector wi is generated. Those xi,j associated with zero
weights wi,j = 0 do not influence the local field, so that their value is just chosen
randomly. But the other input bits xi,j are divided into L groups according to
the absolute value l = |wi,j| of their corresponding weight. Then ci,l input bits
are selected randomly in each group and set to xi,j = sgn(wi,j), while the other
nk,l − ck,l inputs are set to xi,j = −sgn(wi,j).
Simulations show that queries generated by this algorithm result in local fields
hi which match the set value σiH on average [23]. Additionally, only very small
deviations are observed, which are caused by the restriction of inputs and weights
to discrete values. So this algorithm is indeed suitable for the generation of
queries.
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